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When adjudicating high-value cases involving the licensing of patents
covering industry standards such as Wi-Fi and 5G (standards-essential patents
or SEPs), courts around the world have increasingly issued injunctions
preventing one party from pursuing parallel litigation in another jurisdiction
(anti-suit injunctions or ASIs). In response, courts in other jurisdictions have
begun to issue anti-anti-suit injunctions, or even anti-anti-anti suit
injunctions, to prevent parties from hindering the proceedings in those courts.
Most of these activities have been limited to the United States and Europe, but
in 2020 China emerged as a powerful new source of ASIs in global SEP
litigation. The comparative law literature uses the notion of legal transplant to
describe the introduction of a foreign legal concept, rule, or procedure. Taking
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the view that the emergence of ASIs in China represents a new form of transplant
from Western legal systems, this Article analyzes the transplantation of this
procedural mechanism to China. This recent development can be viewed as both
surprising, given China’s civil law tradition, and predictable, considering the
country’s prominence in global technology markets. Equally predictable have
been the strong reactions of foreign courts and policymakers to China’s use of
this mechanism, which has now proceeded at a pace that outstrips that of any
other country. This Article traces the emergence of ASIs in China by examining
how the Chinese legal system has adapted a procedural mechanism that has been
repeatedly used in the United States and other jurisdictions. The Article further
elucidates the internal and external forces that led to the mechanism’s rapid
adoption in China. It sheds new light on the process of legal transplantation in
the twenty-first century as well as its global ramifications.
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INTRODUCTION
On December 25, 2020, the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court in
China issued an “act preservation” order1 prohibiting Swedish patent
holder Ericsson from bringing a legal action anywhere else in the
world to resolve its patent dispute with Korean manufacturer Samsung
until the Wuhan court had completed its adjudication.2 This order
provided a remedy that was functionally equivalent to the anti-suit
injunctions (ASIs) increasingly issued by courts in the United States

1. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国民事诉讼
法) [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, amended June 27, 2017, effective
July 1, 2017), art. 100 [hereinafter 2017 Civil Procedure Law]. Some commentators
and media have also used the translation “behavior preservation” order or measure.
E.g., Mark Cohen, China’s Evolving Case Law on ASI’s, CHINA IPR (Mar. 4, 2021),
https://chinaipr.com/2021/03/04/chinas-evolving-case-law-on-asis
[https://perma.cc/6ZMW-JGNA] [hereinafter Cohen, China’s Evolving Case].
2. Sanxing Dianzi Zhushihuishe Yu Ailixin Gongsi Biaozhun Biyao Zhuanli
Xukefei Jiufen An (三星电子株式会社与爱立信公司标准必要专利许可费纠纷案) [Samsung
Elecs. Co. v. Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson], (2020) E 01 Zhi Min Chu No. 743
((2020)鄂01知民初743号) (Wuhan Interm. People’s Ct. Dec. 25, 2020) [hereinafter
Samsung Elecs. (Wuhan)]. Samsung filed its initial complaint in the Wuhan court on
December 7, 2020. Ericsson Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:20-CV-00380-JRG, 2021
WL 89980, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2021).
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and other jurisdictions in global patent disputes.3 At stake were the
royalties—likely in the billions of dollars—that Samsung would pay to
Ericsson to operate under the latter’s worldwide patents covering 4G
and 5G wireless telecommunications standards, as well as Ericsson’s
compliance with its obligation to offer Samsung a license on terms that
are at least fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND).4
Prior to being notified of Samsung’s claim in the Wuhan court,
Ericsson brought a claim of its own in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas.5 Three days after the Chinese ruling, the
Texas court issued a temporary restraining order barring Samsung
from taking any action in Wuhan that would interfere with the Texas
court’s ability to determine Ericsson’s FRAND obligations to
Samsung.6 Known generally as an anti-anti-suit injunction (AASI), this
order posed a direct conflict with the Wuhan court’s order, which
included an anti-anti-anti-suit injunction (AAASI) to prevent Ericsson
from taking legal action elsewhere that would undermine the Wuhan
court’s original ASI.7
In the end, there was no clear court to resolve this dispute. If the
Wuhan court determined Ericsson’s global FRAND rate, Samsung
might violate the Texas injunction. But if the Texas court made that
determination, Ericsson might violate the Wuhan injunction. The
competing orders in the Ericsson v. Samsung dispute sounded alarm
bells throughout the international patent community, prompting a
number of amicus briefs and other filings by individuals including a
former Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,8 two former

3. See discussion infra Section III.C.4, Part IV.
4. A FRAND commitment is an obligation undertaken by a participant in a
standards development organization to grant licenses of its patents that are essential
to the implementation of one of the organization’s standards on terms that are fair,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. See discussion infra Section II.B.
5. Emergency Application for Temporary Restraining Order and AntiInterference Injunction Related to Samsung’s Lawsuit Filed in the Wuhan
Intermediate People’s Court of China, Ericsson, No. 2:20-CV-00380-JRG (E.D. Tex. Dec.
28, 2020).
6. Ericsson, No. 2:20-CV-00380-JRG (E.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2020) (granting the
temporary restraining order). The district court followed the temporary restraining
order with a preliminary injunction on January 11, 2021. Ericsson, 2021 WL 89980, at
*1.
7. Samsung Elecs. (Wuhan), supra note 2.
8. Brief for Senator Thom Tillis, Honorable Paul R. Michel, and Honorable
Andrei Iancu as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Ericsson, No. 21-1565 (Fed. Cir.
Apr. 9, 2021) [hereinafter Tillis-Michel-Iancu Brief].
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Chief Judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,9 a
former chair of the Intellectual Property Subcommittee of the U.S.
Senate Judiciary Committee,10 as well as a group of international
intellectual property professors.11 Under the pressure of this type of
high-stakes legal stalemate, the parties’ only option might be to settle,
which Ericsson and Samsung did, on undisclosed terms, during the
appeal of the Texas order to the Federal Circuit.12
These clashing orders by Chinese and U.S. courts, buttressed by
additional claims and crossclaims in other jurisdictions,13 as well as an
action in the U.S. International Trade Commission,14 are symptomatic
of the jurisdictional battles that have recently arisen in global FRAND
disputes. In these battles, which are routinely waged in up to a dozen
jurisdictions,15 courts have increasingly issued ASIs to prevent one
party from pursuing parallel litigation in another jurisdiction. In the
FRAND context, these ASIs—traditionally granted by courts in the
United Kingdom and the United States16—prevent a party from
seeking a rate determination in a foreign court when that
determination is pending in the issuing court.
9. Id.; Brief for Honorable Paul R. Michel (Ret.) Supporting Plaintiffs, Ericsson,
No. 2:20-CV-00380-JRG (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2021); Declaration of Randall R. Rader,
Ericsson, No. 2:20-CV-00380-JRG (E.D. Tex. Jan. 1, 2021).
10. Tillis-Michel-Iancu Brief, supra note 8.
11. Brief for International Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae
Supporting Neither Party, Ericsson, No. 21-1565 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 1, 2021) [hereinafter
International Intellectual Property Law Professors’ Brief]. Two of us (Contreras and
Peter Yu) were signatories to this brief.
12. Press Release, Ericsson, Ericsson and Samsung Sign Global Patent License
Agreement (May 7, 2021), https://www.ericsson.com/en/press-releases/2021/5/
ericsson-and-samsung-sign-global-patent-license-agreement.
13. See Lucia Osborne-Crowley, Ericsson Brings Samsung 5G Patent Battle to UK Courts,
LAW360 (Apr. 16, 2021, 2:08 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1375442/
ericsson-brings-samsung-5g-patent-battle-to-uk-courts (referencing Case No. HP-2021000008 in the High Court of Justice).
14. See Dave Simpson, Ericsson Fires Back, Asks ITC to Block Samsung 5G Imports,
LAW360 (Jan. 22, 2021, 11:15 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1347796/
ericsson-fires-back-asks-itc-to-block-samsung-5g-imports.
15. For example, when Vringo, an SEP holder, sued Chinese smartphone
manufacturer ZTE, the litigation occurred over four years across twelve different
jurisdictions: Australia, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Malaysia, the
Netherlands, Romania, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. David L.
Cohen, A Short History of Vringo’s Battle with ZTE, KIDON IP (Aug. 2, 2018),
https://www.kidonip.com/news/a-short-history-of-vringos-battle-with-zte
[https://perma.cc/9NLB-JVZ8].
16. See discussion infra Section II.D.
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In response, courts in other jurisdictions—namely France, Germany,
and India—have begun to issue AASIs to prevent parties from seeking
ASIs that would hinder the proceedings in those courts.17 Some courts
have even issued AAASIs, prohibiting a party from seeking an AASI, as
evidenced by the Wuhan court’s order in Samsung.18 Amid this
international jockeying for jurisdictional control, commentators have
wondered where and how these patent litigation battles will end and
whether every country involved in multi-jurisdictional FRAND disputes
will get into the ASI game.19 With five judgements issued in 2020 alone,
China has now emerged as another major jurisdiction—and perhaps
the jurisdiction—in which litigants may seek ASIs in global FRAND
disputes.20
This new development is noteworthy for three reasons. First, the ASI,
as a procedural mechanism, is largely a creation of courts in common
law jurisdictions, as opposed to civil law jurisdictions. This mechanism,
which has existed in the Anglo-American legal tradition for centuries,
originated in the need to rationalize parallel jurisdiction in the English
courts of law and the ecclesiastical courts of equity.21 Given this
common law heritage, the ASI has not historically been utilized in civil
law jurisdictions such as China, France, or Germany. Indeed, civil law
judges have expressed displeasure at their increasing use and have
issued AASIs to counter their effects.22
Second, a procedural mechanism like an ASI has not traditionally
existed under Chinese law until recently. Other than a few cases in
maritime law, we are unaware of the issuance of an ASI by a modern
Chinese court until 2020.23 The recent spate of ASIs by Chinese courts
17. See infra text accompanying note 177.
18. Samsung Elecs. (Wuhan), supra note 2.
19. See Jorge L. Contreras, It’s Anti-Suit Injunctions All the Way Down—The Strange
New Realities of International Litigation over Standards-Essential Patents, IP LITIGATOR,
July/Aug. 2020, at 14, 20 [hereinafter Contreras, All the Way Down].
20. See discussion infra Section III.C; see also Yu Yang & Jorge L. Contreras, Will
China’s New Anti-Suit Injunctions Shift the Balance of Global FRAND Litigation?, PATENTLY-O
(Oct. 22, 2020), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/10/contreras-injunctionslitigation.html [https://perma.cc/TX9S-3YEG] (discussing Conversant v. Huawei and
ZTE and InterDigital v. Xiaomi, the first two cases in which Chinese courts issued ASIs).
21. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
22. See infra text accompanying note 171.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 320–24. Historical research has shown the
use of a prototype of this injunction in imperial China. See Bradly W. Reed, Money and
Justice: Clerks, Runners, and the Magistrate’s Court in Late Imperial Sichuan, 21 MOD. CHINA
345, 373–74 (1995) (“In Jiaqing 18 (1813), . . . Baxian magistrate Dong Shun
responded to [a request for an injunction barring adjudication at the subcounty level]
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therefore deserves scholarly and policy attention, as it will inform our
understanding of both the changing international patent litigation
landscape and recent legal and intellectual property developments in
China.24
Third, the Chinese courts’ proactive effort in issuing ASIs in FRAND
disputes has alarmed policymakers, international observers, and
patent litigants. For example, in April 2021, the United States Trade
Representative referred to China’s increasing use of ASIs as “worrying.”25
In March 2022, a bipartisan group of five U.S. senators introduced the
Defending American Courts Act, which seeks to impose penalties on
parties seeking to enforce foreign ASIs, including those from China,
in U.S. courts.26 Across the Atlantic, the European Commission has
noted the growing challenges that “very broad extraterritorial anti-suit
injunctions” have posed to European companies operating abroad.27
Alarmed by the issuance of ASIs by Chinese courts, the European
Union, in July 2021, submitted a formal request to China under Article
63.3 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights28 (TRIPS Agreement) of the World Trade
Organization (WTO).29 That request sought information concerning
the latest cases involving the issuance of ASIs, the legal status of the

by commanding a tablet to be inscribed with orders, forbidding local residents from
lodging [legal] plaints with either of the subcounty yamens. Following a petition from
twelve Baxian gentry sixty-three years later in Guangxu 2 (1876), circuit intendant Yao
Jinyuan issued a similar proclamation proscribing the hearing of cases at subcounty
yamens.” (citation omitted)).
24. See discussion infra Part IV.
25. OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2021 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 40, 47–48
(2021).
26. S. 3772, 117th Cong. § 2; see Jorge L. Contreras, Guest Post by Prof. Contreras: A
Statutory Anti-Anti-Suit Injunction for U.S. Patent Cases?, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 18, 2022),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2022/03/contreras-statutory-injunction.html
(exploring the reasons behind the Defending American Courts Act and its potential
impact).
27. Making the Most of the EU’s Innovative Potential: An Intellectual Property Action Plan
to Support the EU’s Recovery and Resilience, at 17, COM (2020) 760 final (Nov. 25, 2020).
28. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 63.3,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
29. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intell. Prop. Rts., Request for Information
Pursuant to Article 63.3 of the TRIPS Agreement: Communication from the European Union to
China, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/682 (July 6, 2021) [hereinafter Article 63.3 Request].
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“typical case” (dianxing anjian)30 designation, adjudication guidelines
on act preservation measures, as well as the legal bases for setting
global license rates and issuing ASIs and AAASIs.31 The Chinese
government subsequently contested its obligation to provide the
requested information.32 In February 2022, the European Union filed
a WTO complaint against China,33 alleging violations of Article 63.1
and 63.3 of the TRIPS Agreement.34
This Article traces the emergence of ASIs in China by examining
how the Chinese legal system has made available to local and foreign
litigants a procedural mechanism that has traditionally been used in
the United States and other common law jurisdictions. The Article
aims to elucidate the internal and external forces that led to the rapid
adoption of this mechanism in China. By focusing on the Chinese
courts’ issuance of ASIs, we also hope to shed new light on the process
of legal transplantation35 in the twenty-first century as well as its global
ramifications.
Part I of this Article summarizes the theory and history of legal
transplants, with a focus on the transplantation of Western legal and
30. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Caipan Wenshu Gongbu Guanli Banfa, Fashi
[2016]
Shijiu
Hao
(最高人民法院裁判文书公布管理办法,
法释【2016】19号)
[Administrative Measures for the Publication of Judgements by the Supreme People’s
Court, Judicial Interpretation No. 19 [2016]] (promulgated by the Judicial Comm.
Sup. People’s Ct., June 15, 2000, effective June 15, 2000), art. 2.2 (referring to dianxing
anjian as cases that have “certain guiding effects”); see also Council for Trade-Related
Aspects of Intell. Prop. Rts., Response to the European Union’s Request for Information
Pursuant to Article 63.3 of the TRIPS Agreement: Communication from China, ¶ 4, WTO Doc.
IP/C/W/683 (Sept. 7, 2021) [hereinafter Article 63.3 Response] (“[T]he ‘typical’ cases,
‘typical technology cases’ and ‘big’ cases mentioned in the EU communication are
cases for reference and have no legal effect of general application. These cases and
adjudication guidelines extracted from these cases serve to timely summarize the trial
experiences, strengthen publicity of the rule of law and provide references for judicial
practices and legal education.”). Given the civil law nature of the Chinese legal system,
a dianxing anjian is different from a binding legal precedent under the principle of
stare decisis in the common law tradition.
31. Article 63.3 Request, supra note 29, at 3–5.
32. See Article 63.3 Response, supra note 30, ¶ 2 (noting that “China has taken note
of the request for information by the European Union pursuant to Article 63.3 of the
TRIPS Agreement” and that “there is no such obligation under the TRIPS Agreement
for China to respond”).
33. Request for Consultations by the European Union, China—Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS611/1 (Feb. 22, 2022).
34. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 28, arts. 63.1, 63.3.
35. See discussion infra Section I.A (detailing legal transplants and the process of
legal transplantation).
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intellectual property standards in China. Part II describes the
international standardization system and the global jurisdictional
battles that have recently emerged over standards-essential patents
(SEPs) and FRAND licensing. This Part also discusses the increasing
use of ASIs in FRAND disputes in the United Kingdom, the United
States, and other jurisdictions. To facilitate comparative analysis and
to illustrate the process of legal transplantation, Part III traces similar
developments in China. Specifically, this Part documents the evolution
of the Chinese standardization system and the country’s growing role
in international standardization. It also discusses FRAND litigation in
China and the Chinese courts’ issuance of ASIs in 2020. Part IV
explores the internal and external forces driving China’s recent effort
to transplant ASIs from abroad. Arguing that the ASI represents a new
form of legal transplant in the country, this Part discusses the
distinctive features of this transplant and its global ramifications. This
Article takes note of the impact Chinese ASI transplants will have on
U.S. and global FRAND litigation and concludes with a call for a
renewed emphasis on international comity in cases where courts
consider the issuance of ASIs, AASIs, and AAASIs.
I. THEORY AND HISTORY OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTATION
A. Legal Transplants
From Jeremy Bentham to Alan Watson, many leading lights have
studied legal transplants,36 which the latter has defined as “the
borrowing and transmissibility of rules from one society or system to
another.”37 Although comparative law scholars remain divided about
the normative desirability of legal transplants or the place of this
concept in the field of comparative law,38 legal transplants can be
36. For early book-length treatments of legal transplants, see generally Jeremy
Bentham, Of the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation, in 1 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (John Bowring ed. 1962) (1843); ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993).
37. WATSON, supra note 36, at 19; see also Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in
International Copyright: Some Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199, 199 (1994)
(defining legal transplant as the process by which “any legal notion or rule which, after
being developed in a ‘source’ body of law, is . . . introduced into another, ‘host’ body
of law”).
38. See William Twining, Globalisation and Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A
HANDBOOK 69, 83 (Esin Örücü & David Nelken eds., 2007) (noting the “long-running
debates between Alan Watson and a number of leading scholars, including Otto KahnFreund, Lawrence Friedman, Pierre Legrand, and Esin Örücü”).
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found in virtually every country today. The borrowing and diffusion of
laws dates back to the time before the Roman Empire.39 In his seminal
work, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, Professor
Watson discusses the reception of Roman law in Roman Egypt and
Scotland.40 In the past few centuries, European colonial powers have
also transplanted their legal standards extensively to their colonies.41
Even three decades ago, many African countries retained on their
books outdated intellectual property laws left behind by colonial
powers.42
Today, the use of legal transplants continues, often in the form of
obligations under international trade agreements. In the intellectual
property area, for instance, developing country policymakers and their
39. See Chen Lei, Contextualizing Legal Transplant: China and Hong Kong, in
METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 192, 192 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri ed., 2012) (“Long
before the publication of Alan Watson’s magisterial book on the historical
transposition of Roman laws to Europe, China had already been experimenting both
with exporting its own law and importing foreign law.” (footnote omitted)); WATSON,
supra note 36, at 21 (“[L]egal transplants . . . have been common since the earliest
recorded history.”); Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953, 997–
98 (2011) (discussing the imperial tributary system through which pre-modern China
transplanted values, norms, and institutions to its neighbors).
40. WATSON, supra note 36, at 31–35, 44–56; see also id. at 22 (“[I]t is an accepted
fact that most of the private law of all the modern legal systems of the Western world
(and also of some non-Western countries), apart from the Scandinavian, derives more
or less directly from either Roman Civil Law or English Common Law.”).
41. See Robert Burrell, Reining in Copyright Law: Is Fair Use the Answer?, 4 INTELL.
PROP. Q. 361, 362 (2001) (“Although most former colonies have now had their own
copyright legislation for a considerable number of years, for the most part this
legislation has tended to follow the Imperial model developed in 1911.” (footnote
omitted)); Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives
of Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INT’L
& COMPAR. L. 315, 325 (2003) (noting “the extension of intellectual property laws to
the colonies for purposes associated generally with the overarching colonial strategies
of assimilation, incorporation and control”); Peter K. Yu, Customizing Fair Use
Transplants, LAWS, Mar. 2018, no. 9, at 12, https://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/7/1/9
[https://perma.cc/K6PC-K84N] [hereinafter Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants]
(“Australia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Israel (as Mandate Palestine), Singapore and Sri
Lanka were all parts of the British Empire. Because of their colonial status, they had
no choice but to adopt the British fair dealing model.”).
42. See Okediji, supra note 41, at 335 & n.73 (“It is well-known . . . that most
developing countries retained the structure and form of laws and institutions
established during the colonial period, including intellectual property laws. Indeed,
prior to the compelled compliance with intellectual property rights imposed by the
TRIPS Agreement, many developing and least developed countries still had as their
own domestic laws the old Acts and Ordinances of the colonial era.” (footnote
omitted)).
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supportive commentators have repeatedly criticized the TRIPS
Agreement43 and TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and plurilateral
agreements for imposing high and inappropriate protection and
enforcement standards on developing countries.44 More subtle
attempts at legal transplants have also emerged out of technical
assistance or capacity building programs, especially those funded by
countries interested in transplanting their laws locally.45
Thus far, commentators have advanced four main lines of criticism
of legal transplants.46 First, as the failed “law and development”
43. See generally GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST
VISION OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REGIME 33–34 (2012) (discussing the coercion narrative on the origins of the TRIPS
Agreement); Donald P. Harris, TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion Part II: Back to the Past or
a Small Step Forward?, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 185, 188 (characterizing the TRIPS
Agreement as a “treaty of adhesion . . . that was procured through coercion as a result
of unequal bargaining power, resulting in unfair surprise and grossly unfair burdens
for the weaker party”); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 369, 373–75 (2006) (discussing the coercion narrative).
44. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (Christopher
Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007) (collecting essays discussing free
trade agreements in the intellectual property context); Peter K. Yu, The International
Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 866–70 (2007) [hereinafter Yu, International
Enclosure Movement] (discussing the TRIPS-plus enclosure of the developing countries’
policy space in the intellectual property area).
45. See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND
THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
181 (2009) (“In the realm of TRIPS implementation, capacity-building was rarely just
a ‘technical’ matter. . . . On the economic front, capacity-building was often used to
‘buy’ stronger [intellectual property] administration and enforcement in developing
countries.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 21, 25 (2004) (“[T]he countries in a position to provide assistance do so
on their own terms; that is, they help implement highly protectionist regimes, without
regard for the actual needs of developing nations.”); Christopher May, Capacity
Building and the (Re)production of Intellectual Property Rights, 25 THIRD WORLD Q. 821, 822
(2004) (“[C]apacity building for [intellectual property rights] . . . may . . . lead to
effective ‘epistemic lock-in’: capacity building programmes socialise policy makers,
practitioners and others into a specific way of dealing with, and regulating,
[intellectual property rights]. It encourages the development of a TRIPs mind-set.”);
Peter K. Yu, Thinking About the Trans-Pacific Partnership (and a Mega-Regional Agreement
on Life Support), 20 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 97, 109 (2017) (“Oftentimes, . . . ‘best
practices’ are introduced [by technical assistance experts] without regard to a
particular country’s local needs, interests, conditions, or priorities.”).
46. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Transplant and Transformation of Intellectual Property
Laws in China, in GOVERNANCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA AND EUROPE
20, 29–32 (Nari Lee et al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter Yu, Transplant and Transformation]
(discussing these four main lines of criticisms in greater detail).
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movement in the 1960s and early 1970s has taught us, legal transplants
tend to be insensitive to the local environment.47 Second, the
introduction of reforms based on foreign legal standards may
exacerbate the dire economic plight of recipient jurisdictions,
especially those in the developing world.48 Third, legal transplants
reduce interjurisdictional competition while taking away valuable
opportunities for experimentation with new regulatory and economic
policies.49 Finally, legal transplants, especially those involving
controversial laws and policies from abroad, could import problems
from
source
jurisdictions
while
generating
unintended
consequences.50
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, legal transplants can provide
important assistance to recipient jurisdictions. In prior work, one of us
(Peter Yu) identified four major benefits of legal transplants:
First, legal transplants allow countries, especially those with limited
resources, to take a free ride on the legislative efforts of other,
usually more economically and technologically developed,
countries. . . . Second, [these] transplants can provide standards
that have served as time-tested solutions to similar problems,
47. See JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID
280 (1980) (contending that the law and development movement is
“an energetic but flawed attempt to provide American legal assistance and to transfer
American legal models, which were themselves flawed”).
48. See Yu, International Enclosure Movement, supra note 44, at 828 (lamenting how
the erosion of policy space in the international intellectual property arena has “forced
[developing countries] to adopt inappropriate intellectual property systems” while
taking away “their ability to respond to domestic crises within their borders”).
49. See John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 685, 703–09 (2002) (discussing how interjurisdictional competition can enable
each jurisdiction to match its laws to local preferences while providing a check on
government and how countries can develop legal systems by experimenting with new
regulatory and economic policies).
50. See Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private
Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279, 300–02
(2004) (expressing concern about international patent harmonization “at the very
time when the domestic standards of the United States and the operations of its patent
system are under critical assault” and fearing that “bad decisions and bad laws are far
more likely to emerge than good laws that appropriately balance public and private
interests”); Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the
Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1127 (2009) (“At the end of
the day, discreetly following in the technology-exporting countries’ [intellectual
property] footsteps will merely bring the high- and middle-income developing
countries face to face with the serious problems that [developed] countries have
themselves failed to solve.”).
IN LATIN AMERICA
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drawing on lessons learned from the experiences in the source
countries—both positive and negative. . . . Third, legal transplants
may help provide pre-emptive defences to countries that face
repeated or intense pressure from their more powerful trading
partners, not to mention the strong likelihood that the laws in these
powerful countries will eventually become international standards
by virtue of the source countries’ sheer economic and political
might. . . . [Fourth], if a substantial portion of the international
community has already adopted the transplanted laws, such
transplants will promote benefits that are derived from greater
harmonization.51

Whether a country can take advantage of these benefits and use legal
transplants effectively will depend on its success in customizing and
assimilating the imported standards based on local needs, interests,
conditions, and priorities.52 The more customized and assimilated
those transplants are, the more appropriate and effective they will
become.
Finally, the same laws may operate differently in the source and
recipient jurisdictions. As Professor Watson reminds us:
[A] voluntary reception or transplant almost always—always in the
case of a major transplant—involves a change in the law, which can
be due to any number of factors, such as climate, economic
conditions, religious outlook . . . or even chance largely
unconnected either with particular factors operating within the
society as a whole or with the general historical trend.53

51. Yu, Transplant and Transformation, supra note 46, at 32–34.
52. See Nari Lee, Intellectual Property Law in China—From Legal Transplant to
Governance, in GOVERNANCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA AND EUROPE,
supra note 46, at 5, 9 (“[I]f the law is there to recognize a pre-existing normative order,
without localization, the laws that are introduced to a foreign culture may only be
implemented successfully as a matter of an ‘unusual and accidental coincidence’ as
noted by Montesquieu.”); Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants, supra note 41, at 11
(“[R]egardless of whether a legal transplant is widely supported by the local populace
or forced upon them from abroad, the transplanted law needs to be customized to
local conditions if it is to be effective and if it is to receive wide public support.”); Peter
K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L.
REV. 693, 755 (2010) (“[L]ike the transplant of plants or human organs, the [legal
transplantation] process requires a careful process of evaluation, selection, adaptation,
and assimilation.”); see also WATSON, supra note 36, at 27 (“A successful legal
transplant—like that of a human organ—will grow in its new body, and become part
of that body just as the rule or institution would have continued to develop in its parent
system.”).
53. WATSON, supra note 36, at 97.
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Such transformation is unsurprising considering the vast differences
in histories, cultures, values, and philosophies across jurisdictions.54
Because laws tend to be applied or interpreted by reference to
domestic market conditions, social contexts, competitive conditions,
and local practices, transplanted laws can also generate very different
outcomes and impacts in the recipient jurisdiction even if those laws
have been transplanted verbatim from the source jurisdiction.55
B. Legal Transplants in China
China is no stranger to legal transplants. Since the First Opium War
(1839–1842) forced its door open to the outside world, the country has
slowly embraced Western laws and institutions.56 In the beginning,
China did so very reluctantly, and its “unequal treaties” with the
Western colonial powers dictated most of the legal and institutional
reforms.57 For example, the widely detested extraterritoriality
provisions (lingshi caipanquan) allowed foreigners accused of crimes
against Chinese subjects to be tried in China not by local laws or local
courts, but by their own laws and the representatives of their home
governments.58 As William Alford observes, those provisions
“mandated that Chinese seeking redress against foreigners avail
54. See id. at 116 (“Transplanting frequently, perhaps always, involves legal
transformation.”).
55. See id. (“Even when the transplanted rule remains unchanged, its impact in a
new social setting may be different. The insertion of an alien rule into another
complex system may cause it to operate in a fresh way.”); Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
International Intellectual Property Litigation: A Vehicle for Resurgent Comparativist Thought?,
49 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 429, 436 (2001) (“[E]ven identical rules of law may lead to
different results when applied in different social contexts by different tribunals.
National laws . . . are normally applied by reference to national market conditions.
Factual differences in social practices, competitive conditions or consumer attitudes
will lead to different legal conclusions (even under the same legal standard) that rest
on those factual findings.”); Geller, supra note 37, at 207–09 (discussing relativist
challenges to legal transplant analysis caused by differing linguistic, cultural, or
historical perspectives).
56. See generally IMMANUEL C.Y. HSÜ, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 858–69 (6th ed.
2000) (discussing the First Opium War and its aftermath).
57. See generally id. at 139–219, 295–350, 387–406 (discussing semicolonial rule in
China in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and many “unequal treaties” the
country was forced to sign).
58. See id. at 190–91 (noting the inclusion of exterritoriality provisions in the 1843
Treaty of the Bogue with Great Britain, the 1844 Treaty of Wangxia with the United
States, and the 1844 Treaty of Whampoa with France). See generally GEORGE W. KEETON,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA (1969) (providing a
comprehensive discussion of the development of extraterritoriality in China).
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themselves, especially without assistance, of a legal order the
fundamental principles of which were alien to the Chinese legal
tradition.”59 As a result, the imposition of extraterritoriality on China
created the same problems that the Western powers complained about
when the imperial court in the Qing dynasty required foreign nationals
and businesses to abide by local laws and customs.60
By the mid-nineteenth century, however, some in the Qing court
began to realize the need for modernization.61 For the next few
decades, China undertook major diplomatic, military, industrial, and
institutional reforms in what historians have referred to as the SelfStrengthening Movement.62 China’s love-hate relationship with
Western technologies, ideas, and institutions, and the push and pull
factors that dominated this historic movement, would find parallels in
later transplantation efforts in the country, including those we see
today.63
In the past century, commentators have documented a wide array of
transplants in different areas of law in China.64 Particularly notable
59. WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 33 (1995) (footnote omitted).
60. See id. (“Ironically, th[e] system [of extraterritoriality], imposed by Westerners
because of the injustices Chinese law supposedly perpetrated on foreigners,
perpetrated many of the same injustices on the Chinese, leaving them with few
victories and much skepticism regarding Western justice.”).
61. See HSÜ, supra note 56, at 289–90 (“The great majority of the scholar-official
class regarded foreign affairs and Western-style enterprises as ‘dirty’ and ‘vulgar,’
beneath their dignity.”).
62. The Self-Strengthening Movement lasted from 1861 to 1895. See generally id. at
261–312 (discussing the Self-Strengthening Movement); Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice,
and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual
Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L. L.J. 1, 22–24 (2001) [hereinafter Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and
Perspectives] (discussing the movement in relation to intellectual property reforms in
China).
63. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in
the Twenty-first Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 189 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates
to Partners I] (discussing the “paradox of admiration and skepticism” Chinese officials
have toward the West and Western institutions since the mid-nineteenth century).
64. See, e.g., Chen Jianfu, Modernisation, Westernisation, and Globalisation: Legal
Transplant in China, in ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS—
PERSPECTIVES OF EVOLUTION 91, 91 (Jorge Costa Oliveira & Paulo Cardinal eds., 2009)
(“[T]he modern evolution of Chinese law is largely a process of legal transplantation
in the name of modernization.”); Zheng Wentong, Transplanting Antitrust in China:
Economic Transition, Market Structure, and State Control, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 643, 671–715
(2010) (discussing the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law as a legal transplant); Zhou Ling,
The Independent Director System and Its Legal Transplant into China, 6 J. COMPAR. L. 262,
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were the efforts to modernize the country’s legal system in the early
twentieth century, rebuild that system in the 1980s shortly after the end
of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), and prepare for its accession
to the WTO in December 2001.65 To illustrate the evolving process of
legal transplantation in China, the next Section provides more
detailed discussion in one area of law: intellectual property.
C. Intellectual Property Transplants in China
Until the late 2000s, legal transplants have provided the primary means
by which modern intellectual property standards have been established in
China. To a large extent, “[t]he history of intellectual property laws in
China is a history of legal transplants.”66 Such transplants can be found in
the Great Qing Copyright Law of 1910 (Da Qing Zhuzuoquan Lü),67 the
intellectual property laws introduced in the Republican era (1911–1949),68
as well as the more recent laws and regulations adopted after the
reopening of China in the late 1970s and in the run-up to the country’s

273–80 (2011) (discussing the transplant of the independent director system into
China).
65. See generally ALBERT CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 27–47 (4th ed. 2011) (providing a legal history of modern
China); Peter K. Yu et al., China and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM.
J. ASIAN L. 1, 11–15 (2003) (discussing the legal reforms in the run-up to China’s
accession to the WTO).
66. Yu, Transplant and Transformation, supra note 46, at 20.
67. Da Qing Zhuzuoquan Lü (大清著作权律) [Great Qing Copyright Law] (1910),
reprinted in HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS OF CHINA’S COPYRIGHT LAW 89–94 (Zhou Lin & Li
Mingshan eds., 1999), translated in NORWOOD F. ALLMAN, HANDBOOK ON THE
PROTECTION OF TRADE-MARKS, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADE-NAMES IN CHINA 112–
21 (1924). For discussions of the Great Qing Copyright Law, see generally Lee Jyh-An
& Li Yangzi, The Untold Story of the First Copyright Statute of China: Exploring the 1910
Copyright Code of the Great Qing Dynasty, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE LAW OF
NATIONS, 1860–1920 (P. Sean Morris ed., forthcoming 2022); Li Yufeng & Catherine
W. Ng, Understanding the Great Qing Copyright Law of 1910, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
767 (2008). Adopted the year before the fall of the Qing dynasty and the end of
imperial rule in China, the Republican government continued to use the statute in the
form of a provisional act. Peter K. Yu, A Half-Century of Scholarship on the Chinese
Intellectual Property System, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1045, 1054 n.35 (2018) [hereinafter Yu,
Half-Century of Scholarship].
68. See ALFORD, supra note 59, at 41–53 (discussing the intellectual property laws
adopted during the Republican era, including the 1912 Patent Law, the 1923
Trademark Law, the 1928 Copyright Law, the 1930 Trademark Law, and the 1944
Patent Law).
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accession to the WTO.69 Even the Soviet-style intellectual property
regulations and resolutions that were put in place in the first three
decades of the People’s Republic were transplanted from abroad.70
Although commentators have frequently characterized intellectual
property transplants in China as coerced or involuntary,71 the
transplantation process, like the country’s earlier modernization
efforts, was driven by both “push” and “pull” factors.72 Consider, for
instance, the adoption of the 1984 Patent Law,73 the first modern
Chinese patent statute that included mostly transplanted laws from
Western countries.74 The push factors are both obvious and dominant.
The United States and other trading partners of China wanted
stronger patent protection for their businesses and nationals. Article
VI of the Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of

69. China became the 143rd member of the WTO on December 11, 2001. China,
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_chine_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZL2L-Z3X6].
70. See ALFORD, supra note 59, at 56–66 (discussing the Soviet-style regulations and
resolutions introduced in China in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s); Mark Sidel, The Legal
Protection of Copyright and the Rights of Authors in the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1984:
Prelude to the Chinese Copyright Law, 9 COLUM. J. ART & L. 477, 478–88 (1985) (same).
71. See, e.g., Robert Burrell, A Case Study in Cultural Imperialism: The Imposition of
Copyright on China by the West, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ETHICS 195, 198 (Lionel
Bently & Spyros M. Maniatis eds., 1998) (arguing that the Western approach toward
China “fails to respect other voices and other traditions, and instead posits the moral
superiority of a value system which is far more recent than the tradition it seeks to
condemn”); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 62, at 3–16 (discussing the
United States’ repeated attempts to convert China into a Western intellectual property
regime).
72. See Niklas Bruun & Zhang Liguo, Legal Transplant of Intellectual Property Rights
in China: Norm Taker or Norm Maker?, in GOVERNANCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN CHINA AND EUROPE, supra note 46, at 43, 46 (“Because there was no sufficient
resource of IP [intellectual property] law in the Chinese legal tradition, the easiest way
to build up an IP system was to borrow rules from other countries. The use of
transplants in the IP legislation has been a natural way to go forward in the process.”);
Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA 173, 188–202 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 1st ed. 2007)
[hereinafter Yu, China Puzzle] (discussing the internal push that drove intellectual
property reforms in China in the latter half of the 1990s and in the 2000s).
73. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa (中华人民共和国专利法) [Patent
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985) [hereinafter 1984 Patent Law].
74. See Yu, Transplant and Transformation, supra note 46, at 24–27 (documenting
the history of intellectual property transplants in China).
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America and the People’s Republic of China called for reciprocal
protection of patents, in addition to copyrights and trademarks.75
The pull factors were equally influential. Recognizing the lack of
appropriate indigenous models for developing new intellectual
property laws, China sent delegations to the U.N. Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), and countries such as Australia, Brazil, France,
West Germany, Japan, Romania, Switzerland, the United States, and
Yugoslavia in the 1970s.76 Even though Chinese officials had major
discomfort with the impact of a new patent law on science and
technology and with the introduction of private ownership in a socialist
economy, they realized the country’s desperate need for intellectual
property reforms to move forward and adopted the new law a few years
later.77
In the run-up to China’s accession to the WTO, similar push and
pull factors existed. When China amended the Patent Law for the
75. Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the
People’s Republic of China, China-U.S., art. VI(3), July 7, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4652 (“Both
Contracting Parties agree that each Party shall seek, under its laws and with due regard
to international practice, to ensure to legal or natural persons of the other Party
protection of patents and trademarks equivalent to the patent and trademark
protection correspondingly accorded by the other Party.”); id. art. VI(5) (“Both
Contracting Parties agree that each Party shall take appropriate measures, under its
laws and regulations and with due regard to international practice, to ensure to legal
or natural persons of the other Party protection of copyrights equivalent to the
copyright protection correspondingly accorded by the other Party.”).
76. See ALFORD, supra note 59, at 69 (noting the dispatch of Chinese delegations to
the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Intellectual
Property Organization, major industrial nations, and relatively prosperous socialist
states); ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 78 (2005) (recounting the Chinese delegation to the World
Intellectual Property Organization in November 1973, which was led by future Chief
Justice of the Supreme People’s Court Ren Jianxin); William O. Hennessey, Protection
of Intellectual Property in China (30 Years and More): A Personal Reflection, 46 HOUS. L. REV.
1257, 1283 (2009) (discussing Ren’s 1973 visit to WIPO); Maria C.H. Lin, The Patent
Law of the People’s Republic of China, 13 AIPLA Q.J. 107, 108 (1985) (“In 1978,
delegations were sent to Japan, the United States, France, West Germany, Switzerland,
Australia, Brazil, Romania and Yugoslavia to study their patent laws.”).
77. For discussions of the debates surrounding the drafting of the 1984 Patent
Law, see generally STAFF OF THE SPEC. SUBCOMM. ON U.S. TRADE WITH CHINA OF THE H.
COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., CHINA’S NEW PATENT LAW AND OTHER
RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 18–33 (Comm. Print 1984); ALFORD, supra note 59, at
67–69; MERTHA, supra note 76, at 82–87; Peter K. Yu, Building the Ladder: Three Decades
of Development of the Chinese Patent System, 5 WIPO J. 1, 6 (2013) [hereinafter Yu, Building
the Ladder].
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second time in August 2000 in preparation to join the international
trading body,78 a large part of the amendment was instituted to
conform the law to TRIPS standards and to respond to external
pressure from the developed world.79 Starting in the mid-1980s, those
pressures, coming mostly from the United States, were filled with
threats of economic sanctions, trade wars, non-renewal of mostfavored-nation status, and opposition to China’s entry into the WTO.80
Among the changes China introduced through the second
amendment were a prohibition on offers to sell infringing products,
the tightening of the standards for obtaining a compulsory license, the
introduction of preliminary injunctions, the provision of judicial
review of patent invalidation decisions, and the allowance for the use
of appropriate royalties to calculate damages.81
78. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa (中华人民共和国专利法) [Patent
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Aug. 25, 2000, effective July 1, 2001)
[hereinafter 2000 Patent Law]. When China amended the law the first time in 1992,
less than eight months after it signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the
Protection of Intellectual Property with the United States, external pressure was the
primary driver behind that amendment. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa
(中华人民共和国专利法) [Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Sept. 4, 1992,
effective Jan. 1, 1993) [hereinafter 1992 Patent Law]; see Memorandum of
Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property, China-U.S., art. 1, Jan. 17,
1992, T.I.A.S. No. 12,036 (stipulating the levels of protection provided by Chinese
patent law).
79. See Yu, Building the Ladder, supra note 77, at 10 (“[T]he Second Amendment
was adopted to conform the Chinese patent system to WTO standards. The need for
such conformity was understandable considering China’s willingness to make
significant sacrifices to join the WTO.”). This Amendment nonetheless addressed the
rapidly changing local conditions, such as “the Chinese leaders’ changing attitude
towards the rule of law, the emergence of private property rights and local
stakeholders, the increasing concerns about ambiguities over relationships in stateowned enterprises, and the government’s active push for modernization.” Peter K. Yu,
From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55
AM. U. L. REV. 901, 908 (2006); see also id. at 914–22 (discussing these changing
conditions).
80. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra note 63, at 140–51 (describing the United
States’ use of Section 301 sanctions and various trade threats to induce China to
strengthen protection of intellectual property rights). Section 301 permits the U.S.
President to investigate and impose sanctions on countries engaging in unfair trade
practices that threaten the United States’ economic interests. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411–
2420.
81. 2000 Patent Law, supra note 78, arts. 11, 46, 48–50, 60, 63; see also Peter K. Yu,
China’s Innovative Turn and the Changing Pharmaceutical Landscape, 51 U. PAC. L. REV.
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Like the 1984 Patent Law and the subsequent 1992 amendment, the
2000 amendment was also driven by some pull factors.82 For example,
China placed very high importance on its accession to the WTO,83
leading Samuel Kim to observe that the country was eager “to gain
WTO entry at almost any price.”84 The reformist factions also saw the
benefits of using external pressure and WTO accession to provide
impetus for intellectual property law reforms that they would have
supported in any event.85 To strike an appropriate balance, China
carefully practiced “selective adaptation” strategies to transplant those
intellectual property standards that had been pushed by foreign
countries but that could also provide local benefits.86 In retrospect,
593, 598 (2020) [hereinafter Yu, China’s Innovative Turn] (highlighting the major
changes in the 2000 Patent Law).
82. Compare 2000 Patent Law, supra note 78, with 1992 Patent Law, supra note 78;
1984 Patent Law, supra note 73.
83. See Yu, Transplant and Transformation, supra note 46, at 26 (“[M]any Chinese
leaders and members of the public considered the WTO membership not only as an
economic issue, but also as an issue affecting national pride.”).
84. Samuel S. Kim, China in World Politics, in DOES CHINA MATTER? A REASSESSMENT:
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF GERALD SEGAL 37, 49 (Barry Buzan & Rosemary Foot eds., 2004).
85. See MARK A. GROOMBRIDGE & CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, TIGER BY THE TAIL: CHINA AND
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 41 (1999) (“[A]n international institution such as
the WTO can help bolster China’s reform leadership against powerful hard-liners.”);
Richard Janda & Men Jing, China’s Great Leap of Faith: Telecommunications and Financial
Services Commitments, in CHINA AND THE LONG MARCH TO GLOBAL TRADE: THE ACCESSION
OF CHINA TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 66, 67 (Sylvia Ostry et al. eds., 2003)
(“The Chinese leadership obviously chose to use WTO entry not only to solidify
existing reforms, but also as an engine for further and more dramatic reforms in the
key financial services and telecommunications sectors.”); Kenneth Lieberthal &
Geoffrey Lieberthal, The Great Transition, in HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON DOING
BUSINESS IN CHINA 1, 7 (2004) (“[T]he reformers in the government plan to use the
WTO entry requirements to force the domestic reforms that they believe will make
Chinese firms competitive internationally in the coming decades.”); Peter K. Yu, The
Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 440 (2003) (noting that the United States’
trade threats and coercive tactics “provid[ed] the reformist leaders with the needed
push that helped reduce resistance from their conservative counterparts”).
86. See Wu Handong, One Hundred Years of Progress: The Development of the Intellectual
Property System in China, 1 WIPO J. 117, 118–19 (2009) (discussing the stage of “selective
arrangement in light of domestic development”); Peter K. Yu, When the Chinese
Intellectual Property System Hits 35, 8 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 3, 12 (2018) (“[A]s
China moved from the imitation and transplantation phase to the indigenization and
transformation phase, it has skilfully deployed ‘selective adaptation’ strategies to
ensure the incorporation of only beneficial features of the TRIPS Agreement without
also transplanting its harmful and unsuitable elements.”). See generally Peter K. Yu,
TRIPS and Its Contents, 60 IDEA 149, 207–15 (2020) (discussing the process of selective
adaptation).
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these strategies helped China make the needed legal and policy
changes to catch up with the developed world.
In the late 2000s, China adopted the National Intellectual Property
Strategy87 and began taking an innovative turn that would have serious
ramifications for intellectual property developments at both the
national and international levels.88 The active push for stronger
intellectual property standards was no longer just an effort to placate
the European Union, the United States, and other developed
countries. Rather, China made a deliberate choice to improve its
intellectual property system so that the system could be used to its
advantage. Indeed, the Third Amendment to the Patent Law, the first
major intellectual property law reform the country undertook after
releasing the National Intellectual Property Strategy, differed
significantly from the two earlier amendments.89 While the first two
amendments focused on facilitating compliance with external norms,
this round of patent law reform aimed to address internal needs,
interests, conditions, and priorities.90 The subsequent amendments to

87. STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, GUOJIA ZHISHI CHANQUAN
ZHANLÜE GANGYAO (国家知识产权战略纲要) [AN OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY] (2008), translated at https://wipolex.wipo.int/
en/text/475076 [https://perma.cc/Y6HE-4M3D]; see also Yu, Half-Century of
Scholarship, supra note 67, at 1079–85 (discussing the National Intellectual Property
Strategy). This strategy “provided a comprehensive plan to improve the protection and
management of intellectual property rights while emphasizing the need for active
development of independent or self-controlled intellectual property.” Yu, Transplant
and Transformation, supra note 46, at 27.
88. See Yu, China’s Innovative Turn, supra note 81, at 599–602 (discussing China’s
innovative turn).
89. Compare Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa (中华人民共和国专利法)
[Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009)
[hereinafter 2008 Patent Law], with 2000 Patent Law, supra note 78; 1992 Patent Law,
supra note 78.
90. See Guo He, Patents, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY LAWS
25, 28 (Rohan Kariyawasam ed., 2011) (“The impetus for the early amendments came
from outside, whilst the need for the third amendment [to the Patent Law] originated
from within China, that is to say, the majority of the third amendment was to meet the
needs of the development of the domestic economy and technology originating in
China.”); Yu, Transplant and Transformation, supra note 46, at 27–28 (noting that
“China, for the first time, adjusted its patent standards based on its own needs”).

1558

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1537

trademark, unfair competition, patent, and copyright laws also
generally proceeded in the same direction.91
For instance, the 2019 amendment to the Trademark Law added
new emphasis on the “intent to use,”92 similar to what is found in the
United States.93 The 2020 amendment to the Patent Law included a
new provision on effective patent term extension,94 which Section III.C
will explore in greater depth.95 Adopted around the same time, the
2020 amendment to the Copyright Law expanded the list of
copyrightable subject matter in Article 3,96 embracing new standards
91. These amended laws, in chronological order, were Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa (中华人民共和国商标法) [Trademark Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug.
23, 1982, amended Aug. 30, 2013, effective May 1, 2014) [hereinafter 2013 Trademark
Law]; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Buzhengdang Jingzheng Fa (中华人民共和
国反不正当竞争法) [Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China]

(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, amended
Nov. 4, 2017, effective Jan. 1, 2018); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa (中
华人民共和国商标法) [Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, amended
Apr. 23. 2019, effective Nov. 1, 2019) [hereinafter 2019 Trademark Law]; Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa (中华人民共和国专利法) [Patent Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar.
12, 1984, amended Oct. 17, 2020, effective June 1, 2021) [hereinafter 2020 Patent
Law]; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa (中华人民共和国著作权法)
[Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended Nov. 11, 2020, effective June 1,
2021) [hereinafter 2020 Copyright Law].
92. See 2019 Trademark Law, supra note 91, art. 4 (“A mala fide application for
trademark registration for a purpose other than use shall be rejected.”); see also Dong
Huijuan & Lin Xiuqin, Major Changes in the Chinese Trademark Law in the Transitional
Period, 8 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 50, 51–53 (2018) (discussing the greater
emphasis in Chinese trademark law on trademark use and factual use despite the
“established principle that the exclusive trademark right is primarily obtained by
registration”).
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (allowing for “[a]pplication for bona fide intention to
use trademark”).
94. See 2020 Patent Law, supra note 91, art. 42 (granting a limited extension of the
patent term for up to five years to compensate for the time lost when a pharmaceutical
product is undergoing regulatory review).
95. See discussion infra Section III.C.
96. See 2020 Copyright Law, supra note 91, art. 3 (extending coverage to all works
in the fields of literature, arts, and sciences as long as those works are original and are
expressed in a certain form). For discussions of the major changes in the 2020
amendment, see generally Peter K. Yu, The Long and Winding Road to Effective Copyright
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that are quite similar to the originality and fixation requirements in
U.S. copyright law.97 Striking a compromise between the closed-list
approach to copyright limitations and exceptions in Europe and the
open-ended fair use approach in the United States, Article 24 also
added “other circumstances provided for by laws and administrative
regulations” to the list of enumerated circumstances in which a
copyrighted work may be used without authorization or remuneration.98
Taken together, all of these amendments were carefully transplanted
from abroad to improve China’s national advantage. The
transplantation process involved resembles the one used to introduce
ASIs in China, which will be the focus of the remainder of this Article.
II. USE OF ASIS IN INTERNATIONAL FRAND DISPUTES
To provide the background needed to fully understand the ASIs
issued by Chinese courts, this Part discusses the international
standardization system, global disputes arising from FRAND licensing,
and the increasing use of ASIs in such cases.
A. International Standardization
Technical interoperability standards such as Wi-Fi, 5G, Bluetooth,
and USB enable a wide range of electronic devices—from smartphones
and computers to electric meters and home appliances—to
communicate and interoperate with one another seamlessly and with
minimal user intervention. Such standards, and the widespread
product interoperability that they enable, can promote innovation,
reduce development costs, increase consumer utility, and yield
significant market efficiencies known as “network effects.”99 The
importance of standards continues to grow in today’s interconnected
global economy. Efforts are now underway to develop future
generations of wireless communications protocols that will link a vast
array of devices embedded in personal accessories, medical devices,
Protection in China, 49 PEPP. L. REV. 681 (2022) [hereinafter Yu, Long and Winding Road];
Peter K. Yu, Third Amendment to the Chinese Copyright Law, 69 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
(forthcoming 2022).
97. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”).
98. 2020 Copyright Law, supra note 91, art. 24.
99. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO
THE NETWORK ECONOMY 45–46 (1999); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION
AND COMPETITION 33 (2007).
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vehicles, home appliances, and the built environment: the so-called
“Internet of Things.”100
Such technical standards may be developed in a variety of settings.
Government agencies develop some health, safety, and environmental
standards.101 Individual firms may develop proprietary technologies
that, through broad market adoption, become de facto standards—for
example, Adobe’s portable document format (PDF).102 But most
interoperability standards today are developed by groups of industry
participants that collaborate within voluntary associations known as
standards development organizations (SDOs).103 The standards
produced within these organizations are often referred to as “voluntary
consensus standards,” as they are developed through consensus-based
collaborative processes, and there is no requirement that participants
use the resulting standards.104
The earliest voluntary SDOs in Europe and the United States arose
at the end of the nineteenth century from professional engineering
associations.105 The first of these SDOs with a truly international
outlook was the International Association for Testing Materials, which
was established in 1898.106 Since then, a wide range of international
SDOs have emerged. Examples include officially recognized bodies
that standardize technologies across a wide range of disciplines, such
as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the
100. See Ari Keränen & Carsten Bormann, Internet of Things: Standards and Guidance
from the IETF, IETF J. (Apr. 17, 2016), https://www.ietfjournal.org/internet-of-thingsstandards-and-guidance-from-the-ietf [https://perma.cc/K5CR-FZE6].
101. Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards, Standards-Setting Organizations and
Intellectual Property: A Survey of the Literature (with an Emphasis on Empirical Approaches), in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: VOL. II—
ANALYTICAL METHODS 185, 186 (Peter S. Menell & David L. Schwartz eds., 2019)
[hereinafter Contreras, Technical Standards].
102. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 99, at 16, 254. In several well-known cases (e.g.,
Betamax vs. VHS and HD-DVD vs. Blu-ray), competing firms have engaged in
commercial “standards wars” to determine which of their proprietary formats will
prevail in the market. Id. at 17.
103. Id. at 237; Jorge L. Contreras, A Tale of Two Layers: Patents, Standardization, and
the Internet, 93 DENV. L. REV. 855, 857 (2016) [hereinafter Contreras, A Tale of Two
Layers].
104. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 99, at 238 (explaining that the fundamental
principle in consensus-based standard setting is openness, which is a powerful tool for
establishing credibility).
105. See generally JOANNE YATES & CRAIG N. MURPHY, ENGINEERING RULES: GLOBAL
STANDARD SETTING SINCE 1880, at 19–51 (2019) (providing an overview of the historical
development of international standardization).
106. Id. at 43.

2022]

TRANSPLANTING ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS

1561

European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI); large
private organizations that develop a range of related standards, such as
the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standards
Association and Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF); and smaller
groups often referred to as “consortia” that focus on one or a handful
of related standards, such as the HDMI (High-Definition Multimedia
Interface) Forum and the Bluetooth Special Interest Group.107
B. Patents and Standards
A patent gives its owner the exclusive right to exclude others from
practicing (i.e., making, using, selling, and importing) a claimed
invention throughout the issuing jurisdiction. Patent protection in
most countries lasts for a period of twenty years from the date that the
relevant patent application was filed.108 Patents may cover any system,
device, product feature, process, or improvement so long as it is useful,
novel, and nonobvious, in view of existing technologies and
publications.109 These basic features of patent law are now found in not
only developed countries but also throughout the world, thanks in part
to the legal transplants driven by the TRIPS Agreement.110
Patents often cover products that implement the interface protocols
and designs specified by technical standards. Most of these patents are
owned by one or more firms engaged in the standards-development
process.111 Patents that will necessarily be infringed by a product
conforming to a particular standard are referred to as SEPs.112
Complex technological products may implement dozens or even
hundreds of standards,113 each of which may be covered by hundreds
107. See generally C. Bradford Biddle, No Standard for Standards: Understanding the ICT
Standards-Development Ecosystem, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL
STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 17, 17–28 (Jorge L.
Contreras ed., 2018). The term SDO is often used interchangeably with the term SSO
(standard setting organization). While fine distinctions can be made, this Article treats
these terms as synonymous.
108. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (providing a patent term of twenty years subject
to the payment of maintenance fees).
109. Id. §§ 101–103.
110. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 28, arts. 27.1, 33.
111. Contreras, A Tale of Two Layers, supra note 103, at 860.
112. Id.
113. See Brad Biddle et al., How Many Standards in a Laptop? (And Other Empirical
Questions), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2010 ITU-T KALEIDOSCOPE ACADEMIC CONFERENCE
123, 125 & fig.2 (2010) (finding that 75% of the laptop computer standards studied
were subject to a RAND commitment and 22% were royalty-free).
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or thousands of SEPs.114 The result today is a large body of patents
covering different aspects of certain standards.
For more than a century, SDOs and SDO members have been aware
of the implicit risks in allowing features of an interoperability standard
to be patented. Ordinarily, if the vendor of a product that allegedly
infringes a patent is unable or unwilling to obtain a license on the
terms offered by the patent holder, that vendor has three choices: (1)
stop selling the infringing product; (2) design around the patent; (3)
do neither and risk liability as an infringer.115 With standards-compliant
products, however, designing around the patent may be impossible or
may make the product non-compliant with the standard.116 Moreover,
once an SDO publishes a standard, market participants may make
significant investments anticipating the manufacture of products
incorporating that standard.117 In such cases, the cost of switching from
the standardized technology to an alternative technology may be
prohibitive, creating a “lock in” situation.118 When a product
manufacturer is locked into a particular standard, the SEP holder that
is negotiating with that manufacturer has inordinate bargaining power
and may thus be able to charge a license fee in excess of the value of
the patented technology.119 This phenomenon has been termed
“patent hold-up” and is discussed extensively in the scholarly
literature.120

114. See generally Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, Mapping Standards to Patents Using
Declarations of Standard-Essential Patents, 27 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 504, 504–26
(2018).
115. Jorge L. Contreras, The Global Standards Wars: Patent and Competition Disputes in
North America, Europe and Asia 3 (Univ. of Utah, S.J. Quinney Coll. of L. Legal Stud.
Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No. 353, 2018).
116. Id.
117. These investments include contractual commitments, purchases of durable
goods and capital equipment, employee training, development or procurement of
information technology, identification and outfitting of suppliers, and marketing
campaigns. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 99, at 116–30.
118. Id. at 116; see also In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117, at *51–52
(F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006) (determining that implementers and producers of
complementary products would have needed to spend hundreds of millions of dollars
to switch to an alternative, non-infringing technology).
119. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 99, at 38.
120. E.g., Norman V. Siebrasse, Holdup, Holdout, and Royalty Stacking: A Review of the
Literature, in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS
239 (C. Bradford Biddle et al. eds., 2019); Jorge L. Contreras, Much Ado About Holdup,
2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 875.
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Recognizing this threat, SDOs have implemented a range of policies
to avert patent hold-up affecting their standards. In 1970, the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) adopted a policy
requiring ANSI-accredited SDOs to obtain an assurance from the
patent holder that it would make a license available to all applicants
on terms that either were royalty-free or bore fair and reasonable
royalties.121 The U.S. federal government has enshrined such licensing
commitments in its rules for federal use of privately developed
standards,122 and the European Commission has repeatedly expressed
support for such measures as means to avoid blocking the adoption of
standards.123 As a result, most SDOs around the world today have
adopted policies requiring that SEP holders grant licenses to all
manufacturers of standardized products on royalty-free or FRAND
terms.124
Despite the widespread imposition of FRAND commitments by
SDOs, there is little consensus regarding the methodology to
determine what royalty rates should be considered “fair” and
“reasonable” in any given instance.125 What’s more, few SDOs offer any
guidance on how these elusive terms are defined, and many SDOs
affirmatively disclaim any role in establishing, interpreting, or
adjudicating the reasonableness of FRAND licensing terms.126 As a
121. ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS: DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR AMERICAN
NATIONAL STANDARDS § 3.1.1 (AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST. 2021).
122. Revision of OMB Circular No. A-119, “Federal Participation in the
Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity
Assessment Activities,” 81 Fed. Reg. 4,673 (Jan. 27, 2016).
123. See Standard Essential Patents, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/
industry/strategy/intellectual-property/patent-protection-eu/standard-essentialpatents_en [https://perma.cc/LQJ9-EGLZ] (“The European Commission supports
the improvement of the framework governing the inclusion of patent-protected
technologies into standards and the facilitation of the licensing process for these
technologies.”).
124. See Contreras, Technical Standards, supra note 101, at 206–07 (summarizing
various studies of the patent policies of SDOs and observing that the vast majority of
these policies require SEPs to be licensed on royalty-free or FRAND terms).
125. See id. at 212–15 (describing competing approaches to assessing the fair and
reasonable royalty for a given SEP).
126. See, e.g., Inst. of Elec. & Elecs. Eng’rs, Inc., IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws § 6.2
(Feb. 2022), http://standards.ieee.org/wp-content/uploads/import/documents/
other/sb_bylaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/KH7Y-7ZRZ] (“The IEEE is not responsible
for . . . [d]etermining whether any licensing terms or conditions provided in
connection with submission of a Letter of Assurance, if any, or in any licensing
agreements are reasonable or non-discriminatory.”); S. Bradner & J. Contreras,
Intellectual Property Rights in IETF Technology § 4.D (2017), https://ietf.org/rfc/
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result, when parties cannot agree on FRAND royalty rates, the ultimate
arbiter of these rates is often a court.
C. International Jurisdictional Disputes over SEPs
Courts adjudicating disputes over FRAND royalties face a dilemma.
On one hand, patents are issued under national law and, by definition,
have legal effect only in the issuing jurisdiction. On the other hand,
the parties to FRAND disputes are often multinational corporations
with operations (and patents) around the world. In determining a
FRAND royalty rate, a court must decide whether to focus only on the
patents issued and asserted in its jurisdiction, or to consider the global
business relationship between the parties.127 Even though a domestic
court typically lacks authority to adjudicate infringement damages for
foreign patents, it may determine a global rate for the licensed patent
portfolio in a FRAND dispute because the dispute is essentially
contractual (as opposed to one involving infringement damages for
patents in other jurisdictions).128
In some cases, courts have limited their assessment of FRAND
royalties to the national patents that have been asserted. These cases
include Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,129 In re Innovatio IP Ventures,
LLC,130 Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Systems, Inc.,131 and Optis Wireless
Technology, LLC v. Huawei Device Co.132 In each of these cases, a U.S.
rfc8179.txt.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4AD-4WJZ] (IETF RFC 8179) (“[IETF] will not
make any determination that any terms for the use of an Implementing Technology
(e.g., the assurance of reasonable and non-discriminatory terms) have been fulfilled
in practice.”).
127. Deng Fei et al., Comparative Analysis of Court-Determined FRAND Royalty Rates,
ANTITRUST, Summer 2018, at 47, 47.
128. See Jorge L. Contreras et al., The Effect of FRAND Commitments on Patent Remedies,
in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS, supra note
120, at 160, 161–63 (discussing the differences between adjudication of patent
damages and FRAND royalty rates).
129. No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at *275–76, *294–95 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (noting that the royalty rate should be based on the SEPs used
in a particular device and discounted for the unused patents in an SEP portfolio).
130. No. 11 C 9308, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061, at *41 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2013)
(finding that all of the 168 claims are essential to the 802.11 standard and therefore
subject to a RAND obligation).
131. 773 F.3d 1201, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that royalties should be based
on the value added by the claimed features in the asserted patents).
132. No. 2:17-CV-00123-JRG, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43489, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 18,
2019) (holding that the court can only extend relief as far as its jurisdiction allows, and
thus cannot adjudicate infringement on Chinese patents).
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court determined a FRAND royalty rate and awarded damages to the
SEP holder based on the asserted U.S. patents.133
However, in the recent U.K. case, Unwired Planet International Ltd. v.
Huawei Technologies Co.,134 the court dictated the terms of a global
FRAND license between the parties, covering not only the licensor’s
U.K. patents but also foreign patents covered by the licensor’s FRAND
commitment.135 The U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California took a similar approach in TCL Communication Technology
Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson.136 With the consent of
both parties, that court also determined worldwide FRAND royalty
rates that TCL, a phone manufacturer, should pay to the SEP holder.137
The ability of one domestic court to determine FRAND rates on a
global basis can lead to two forms of legal “race.” First is a “race to the
bottom” among jurisdictions—a well-documented phenomenon in
which jurisdictions intentionally adapt their rules, procedures, and
substantive outlook to attract litigation or other business.138 While such
systemic adaptations are not inherently socially detrimental, there are
numerous examples in which jurisdictional competition has resulted
in lax regulation of public safety and corporate procedure.139 Second,
differences among jurisdictions are likely to encourage parties to
initiate litigation in the most favorable jurisdiction as quickly as
possible, often to foreclose a later suit in a less favorable jurisdiction.
Referred to as a “race to judgement” or a “race to the courthouse,” this
situation may prematurely drive parties to litigation rather than
negotiation or settlement.140 A natural corollary to this type of race is
the attempt by one party to strike first and seek an ASI that prevents

133. Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1233, 1235; Optis Wireless, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43489, at
*8; In re Innovatio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061, at *186–88; Microsoft, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60233, at *302–03.
134. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 (Eng.), aff’d, [2020] UKSC 37.
135. Id. at [793], [794], [807].
136. No. CV 15-2370 JVS(DFMx), 2018 WL 4488286, at *50–52 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14,
2018), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 943 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S.
Ct. 239 (2020).
137. Id. at *34, *56.
138. Jorge L. Contreras, The New Extraterritoriality: FRAND Royalties, Anti-Suit
Injunctions and the Global Race to the Bottom in Disputes over Standards-Essential Patents, 25
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 251, 280–83 (2019) [hereinafter Contreras, New
Extraterritoriality].
139. See id. at 280–81 (citing examples that include corporate registration, ship
registry, and autonomous vehicle regulation).
140. Id. at 283–86.
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another party from pursuing litigation in another or a more favorable
jurisdiction.
D. ASIs in FRAND Cases
1.

Background on ASIs
ASIs are interlocutory in personam remedies issued by a court in one
jurisdiction to prohibit a litigant or related party from initiating or
continuing parallel litigation in another jurisdiction.141 These
remedies are established features of the international litigation
landscape and have been known since the fifteenth century—when
they were developed by the English common law courts to enjoin
parallel proceedings in the equitable Court of Chancery, and vice
versa.142 Today ASIs are issued most frequently by courts in the United
Kingdom and the United States, as courts in civil law jurisdictions have
historically viewed ASIs with suspicion.143 ASIs are issued in a wide
variety of disputes including international commercial, antitrust, and
bankruptcy actions, as well as actions to prevent a party to an

141. Given the jurisdictional rules in different courts, the litigant subject to an ASI
in one jurisdiction may not be the same corporate entity as the litigant in a foreign
jurisdiction. For example, in Ericsson v. Samsung, the Samsung entity that brought an
action in Wuhan was not the same Samsung entity sued by Ericsson in Texas.
Nevertheless, the orders of both the Wuhan and Texas courts encompassed the actions
of Samsung’s applicable corporate family members, which the Texas court viewed at
least as “functionally the same.” Ericsson Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:20-CV00380-JRG, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4392, at *3 n.2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2021).
142. See George A. Bermann, The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation,
28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 589, 593–94 (1990) (noting that the ASI “has deep roots
in English law” and is “[t]raceable at least to fifteenth-century England, [when] the
remedy first appeared in the form of a writ of prohibition by the common law courts
to the ecclesiastical courts to prevent their expansive jurisdictional assertions”); Trevor
C. Hartley, Comity and the Use of Antisuit Injunctions in International Litigation, 35 AM. J.
COMPAR. L. 487, 489–90 (1987) (providing the historical origins of ASIs in England);
S.I. Strong, Anti-Suit Injunctions in Judicial and Arbitral Procedures in the United States, 66
AM. J. COMPAR. L. (SUPPLEMENT) 153, 155–56 (2018) (discussing the English roots of
the U.S. approach to ASIs).
143. See John J. Barceló III, Anti-Foreign-Suit Injunctions to Enforce Arbitration
Agreements, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION—
THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2007, at 107 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2008); Alex C. Lakatos, AntiSuit Injunctions in Defence of Arbitration: Protecting the Right to Arbitrate in Common and Civil
Law Jurisdictions (Part II), MAYER BROWN (Mar. 3, 2008), https://www.
mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2008/03/antisuitinjunctions-in-defence-of-arbitration-pro [https://perma.cc/3BLZ-23GB].
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arbitration agreement from commencing litigation over the arbitral
matter.144
In the United States, the legal standard for issuing ASIs is, as one
commentator puts it, “ambiguous and fragmented.”145 Generally
speaking, courts follow some variant of the three-part framework
developed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in E. &
J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A.146 Under this framework, a court
considering a request for an ASI must first determine whether the
parties and the issues in the action in which the injunction is sought
(the local action) are functionally equivalent to those in the action
sought to be enjoined (the foreign action).147 If not, an injunction
barring a party from pursuing the foreign action would not reduce
duplicative litigation, and would thus be unjustified.148 If the parties
are the same and the issues are functionally equivalent, the court must
next determine whether resolution of the local action would dispose
of the foreign action.149 Generally, a court is unlikely to find the
issuance of an ASI justified if the local action will not resolve the
foreign action. Second, the court must assess whether any of the four
factors identified by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
In re Unterweser Reederei GMBH150 are present—namely, whether the
foreign litigation would “(1) frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the
injunction; (2) be vexatious or oppressive; (3) threaten the issuing
court’s in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction; or (4) . . . prejudice other
equitable considerations.”151 Finally, if at least one of the Unterweser
factors is present, the court must ask whether the injunction will have
a significant impact on international comity.152 If not, the ASI may be
issued.
144. See Lakatos, supra note 143 (discussing ASIs in the arbitration context).
145. Strong, supra note 142, at 154.
146. 446 F.3d 984, 989–91 (9th Cir. 2006). See generally Strong, supra note 142, at
159–64 (discussing ASIs in the international context).
147. Gallo, 446 F.3d at 991.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), aff’d per curiam, 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971) (en
banc), vacated, 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
151. Id. at 890.
152. See Gallo, 446 F.3d at 991; see also id. at 994 (“Comity is ‘the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and
to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of
its laws’” (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895))).
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2.

ASIs and FRAND
The first notable ASI in a FRAND case was issued by the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington in Microsoft Corp. v.
Motorola, Inc.153 This case reflects a typical fact pattern in which ASIs
are sought in FRAND cases. Microsoft argued in the Washington court
that Motorola failed to offer Microsoft a license of certain SEPs on
FRAND terms in violation of Motorola’s commitments to two SDOs.154
Six months later, Motorola sued Microsoft for infringement on some
of those SEPs in Germany.155 The German court, finding infringement,
enjoined Microsoft from selling infringing products in Germany.156 In
response, Microsoft sought an ASI from the Washington court to
prevent Motorola from enforcing its German injunction.157 The
Washington court found that the resolution of the U.S. matter would
dispose of the German matter (i.e., if Motorola were found in the U.S.
action to have breached its FRAND obligations, Motorola would not
be entitled to seek injunctive relief against Microsoft in any
jurisdiction, including Germany).158 Moreover, the Washington court
found that Motorola’s litigation tactics (i.e., seeking the German
injunction) frustrated its own ability to adjudicate the case.159 As a
result, the court entered the ASI against Motorola.160 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.161
Several other ASI actions followed in U.S. FRAND cases including
Vringo, Inc. v. ZTE Corp.,162 TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd.
v. Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson,163 Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc.,164 Optis
Wireless Technology, LLC v. Huawei Technologies Co.,165 and Huawei
153. 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1096–97 (W.D. Wash.), aff’d, 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir.
2012).
154. Id. at 1094–95.
155. Id. at 1096.
156. Id. at 1103 n.14.
157. Id. at 1096.
158. Id. at 1099–1100.
159. Id. at 1100.
160. Id. at 1103.
161. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 889 (9th Cir. 2012).
162. No. 14-cv-4988(LAK), 2015 WL 3498634, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2015)
(denying Vringo’s motion for an ASI).
163. No. 8:14-cv-00341-JVS-AN, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at *18 (C.D. Cal. June
29, 2015) (granting TCL’s motion for an ASI with respect to foreign actions).
164. No. 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD, 2017 WL 3966944, at *18 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7,
2017) (denying Qualcomm’s motion for an ASI).
165. No. 2:17-Cv-00123-JRG-RSP, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81129, at *5 (E.D. Tex. May
14, 2018) (denying Optis’s motion for an ASI).
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Technologies Co. v. Samsung Electronics Co.166 Utilizing the framework
established in Gallo and Unterweser, U.S. courts granted ASIs in about
half of these cases.167
3.

The emergence of AASIs
By 2018, international litigants began resisting ASIs imposed by U.S.
courts by requesting non-U.S. courts that had been targeted by ASIs to
issue AASIs to prevent the U.S. litigants from seeking or enforcing
those ASIs.168 Like an ASI, an AASI operates in personam, prohibiting
a litigant from taking a particular action, rather than purporting to
restrain the authority of a foreign court.169
AASIs are sought less frequently than ASIs, and there is no uniform
framework determining whether and when they will be granted.170
While courts in common law jurisdictions—primarily the United
Kingdom and the United States—have historically issued ASIs, courts
in civil law jurisdictions more typically issue AASIs as counterresponses,
as they have historically found ASIs to be “offensive, even violative of
international law.”171
In Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. IPCom GmbH & Co. KG,172 Lenovo
brought an action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California, claiming that IPCom breached its FRAND obligations
and asking the California court to determine a global FRAND royalty
rate.173 IPCom responded with an action in the United Kingdom
seeking a declaration that Lenovo infringed one of IPCom’s U.K.

166. No 3:16-cv-02787-WHO, 2018 WL 1784065, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018)
(granting Samsung’s motion for an ASI to prevent Huawei from enforcing injunctions
issued by a Chinese court).
167. See Contreras, New Extraterritoriality, supra note 138, at 265–78 (summarizing
the facts and holdings of these cases).
168. Contreras, All the Way Down, supra note 19, at 8–9 (listing various cases in which
European courts issued AASIs to counter the ASIs issued by U.S. courts).
169. Id. at 7 (describing how AASIs work).
170. The leading U.S. case regarding AASIs is Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian
World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 927–31 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See Alexander Shaknes, Anti-Suit
and Anti-Anti-Suit Injunctions in Multi-jurisdictional Proceedings, 21 NYSBA INT’L L.
PRACTICUM 96, 99–100 (2008) (discussing Laker Airways).
171. Barceló, supra note 143, at 107; see also Maximilian Haedicke, Anti-Suit
Injunctions, FRAND Policies and the Conflict Between Overlapping Jurisdictions, 71 GRUR
INT’L 101, 106 (2022) (“German courts consider a prohibition to litigate a violation of
fundamental German law principles.”).
172. No. 5:19-cv-01389-EJD, 2019 WL 6771784 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2019).
173. Id. at *2.
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patents and an injunction against further infringement.174 Soon
thereafter, Lenovo asked the U.S. court for an ASI prohibiting IPCom
from prosecuting an infringement action in the United Kingdom or
elsewhere during the pendency of the U.S. action.175 Before the U.S.
court could make a substantive ruling, IPCom brought an action in the
Paris Court of First Instance seeking to enjoin Lenovo’s sale of
allegedly infringing products in France and to prevent Lenovo from
enforcing the U.S. ASI.176 The Paris court granted the AASI, holding
that ASIs are contrary to French ordre public except when they seek to
prevent the violation of contractual arbitration or jurisdiction clauses.
The court further noted that “seeking an anti-suit injunction—such as
the one pursued by Lenovo in California—would infringe upon
IPCom’s fundamental rights pursuant to French laws.”177 IPCom also
filed a motion for an AASI in the United Kingdom.178 The U.K. court
granted this motion shortly after the decision of the Paris court,
reasoning that “it would be vexatious and oppressive to IPCom if it
were deprived entirely of its right to litigate infringement and validity
of [its U.K. patent].”179
III. USE OF ASIS IN CHINA
Whereas the previous Part documents the use of ASIs in
international FRAND disputes in the source jurisdictions in the legal
transplant narrative, this Part turns to the recipient jurisdiction, China.
Specifically, this Part traces the evolution of the Chinese
standardization system and the country’s growing role and leadership
in international standardization. It then discusses recent SEP and
FRAND cases in China and concludes by providing an in-depth look at
the Chinese courts’ use of ASIs in international FRAND disputes
beginning in 2020.
174. IPCom GmbH & Co. KG v. Lenovo Tech. (U.K.) Ltd. [2019] EWHC (Pat) 3030
[7], [10] (Eng.).
175. Lenovo (U.S.), 2019 WL 6771784, at *1.
176. Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction]
Paris, Nov. 8, 2019, 19/59311, aff’d, Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal]
Paris, Mar. 3, 2020, 19/21426 (Fr.), translated at http://caselaw.4ipcouncil.com/
french-court-decisions/ipcom-v-lenovo-court-appeal-paris-rg-1921426
[https://perma.cc/Y9NL-PF3R].
177. Enrico Bonadio & Luke McDonagh, Paris Court Grants an SEP Anti-Anti-Suit
Injunction in IPCom v Lenovo: A Worrying Decision in Uncertain Times?, 15 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. & PRAC. 149, 149 (2020).
178. IPCom GmbH, [2019] EWHC (Pat) 3030 [1].
179. Id. at [52], [54], [60].

2022]

TRANSPLANTING ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS

1571

A. China’s Growing Role in International Standardization
Despite having a centuries-old appreciation for standardized
systems,180 China entered the arena of international technical
standardization relatively late. In the 1980s, when international
telecommunications standards were first being developed and shortly
after China reopened its economy to the outside world, the country
did not have a domestic technology sector similar to what existed in
Western countries and in Asian rivals such as Japan and South Korea.181
As a result, China operated in catch-up mode in both technology
development and technical standardization.182 Dieter Ernst describes
China’s standardization strategy during this period as “combin[ing]
the adoption of international standards with the insertion of
indigenous innovations into domestic and international standards.”183
Unlike the industry-driven Western standardization system, the
Chinese system heavily depends on a number of governmental
agencies, most notably the State Administration for Market Regulation
and previously the General Administration of Quality Supervision,
Inspection, and Quarantine.184 Given this governmental focus, it has
traditionally been difficult for foreign firms to participate
meaningfully in Chinese SDOs.185
180. See Wang Ping & Zheng Liang, Beyond Government Control of China’s
Standardization System—History, Current Status, and Reform Suggestions, in
MEGAREGIONALISM 2.0: TRADE AND INNOVATION WITHIN GLOBAL NETWORKS 311, 311–14
(Dieter Ernst & Michael G Plummer eds., 2018).
181. See OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-ISC-340, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO CHINA
4–6 (1987) (discussing the need for technology in China after its reopening to the
outside world in the late 1970s).
182. For discussions of China’s catch-up efforts in technology development and
technical standardization, see generally DIETER ERNST, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION AND
GLOBALIZATION: THE CHALLENGE FOR CHINA’S STANDARDIZATION STRATEGY (2011)
[hereinafter ERNST, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION]; Gao Xudong & Liu Jianxin, Catching Up
Through the Development of Technology Standard: The Case of TD-SCDMA in China, 36
TELECOMMS. POL’Y 531 (2012); Richard P. Suttmeier et al., Standards of Power?
Technology, Institutions, and Politics in the Development of China’s National Standards
Strategy, 1 GEOPOLITICS, HIST. & INT’L RELS. 46 (2009); Pierre Vialle et al., Competing with
Dominant Global Standards in a Catching-Up Context: The Case of Mobile Standards in China,
36 TELECOMMS. POL’Y 832 (2012); Liu Xielin & Cheng Peng, Is China’s Indigenous
Innovation Strategy Compatible with Globalization? (E.-W. Ctr., Pol’y Stud. No. 61, 2011).
183. ERNST, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION, supra note 182, at 21.
184. See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol & Zheng Wentong, FRAND in China, 22 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 71, 79–81 (2013); John Seaman, China and the New Geopolitics of Technical
Standardization, NOTES DE L’IFRI, Jan. 2020, at 11–12.
185. See DAN BREZNITZ & MICHAEL MURPHREE, THE RISE OF CHINA IN TECHNOLOGY
STANDARDS: NEW NORMS IN OLD INSTITUTIONS 25 (2013), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
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China’s experience with wireless standardization is representative of
its historical standardization efforts. During the development of
international 1G and 2G wireless standards, China lacked strong
technological capabilities.186 In the case of both the 2G GSM standard
deployed throughout Europe and Qualcomm’s competing cdmaOne
standard, which was widely adopted in South Korea and the United
States,187 Chinese carriers and the government balked at the high
patent rates charged by foreign vendors.188 Thus, by the time that
international 3G standards were developed at the 3rd Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP) in the late 1990s, China decided that it
should embark on its own 3G standardization program.189
China’s 3G standardization effort resulted in the creation of TDSCDMA, which the Chinese Academy of Telecommunications Research
and its state-owned affiliate, Datang, developed in collaboration with
German equipment vendor Siemens.190 China submitted TD-SCDMA to
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) for recognition as
an international standard (over the objection of U.S. and European
representatives), and the ITU approved TD-SCDMA in 2000.191 Yet
despite this recognition, and broad adoption within China, TD-SCDMA
had little support internationally.192

default/files/Research/RiseofChinainTechnologyStandards.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HM2Q-2J6D] (“For foreign firms, . . . there remain obstacles to complete and open
participation in Chinese standards, even as old formal prohibitions are removed.”);
ERNST, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION, supra note 182, at 91–92 (discussing the lack of
foreign participation in the Intelligent Grouping and Resource Sharing standards
project).
186. See Tomoo Marukawa, Diminishing Returns to High-Tech Standards Wars: China’s
Strategies in Mobile Communications Technology 10 (Nat’l Bureau Asian Rsch., Working
Paper, 2014) (“China was merely a consumer of technologies designed by companies
from developed countries at the start of 2G.”).
187. Whasun Jho, Global Political Economy of Technology Standardization: A Case of the
Korean Mobile Telecommunications Market, 31 TELECOMMS. POL’Y 124, 127 (2007); Kenji
E. Kushida, Wireless Bound and Unbound: The Politics Shaping Cellular Markets in Japan
and South Korea, 5 J. INFO. TECH. & POL. 231, 246–47 (2008).
188. See ERNST, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION, supra note 182, at 5; Gao & Liu, supra note
182, at 533; Vialle et al., supra note 182, at 837–38.
189. See ERNST, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION, supra note 182, at 69; Gao & Liu, supra note
182, at 531; Vialle et al., supra note 182, at 839.
190. ERNST, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION, supra note 182, at 69; Gao & Liu, supra note
182, at 531, 534; Vialle et al., supra note 182, at 839.
191. Gao & Liu, supra note 182, at 531; Vialle et al., supra note 182, at 839.
192. See Vialle et al., supra note 182, at 836, 839–40.
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A similar pattern developed with respect to encrypted wireless local
area networking (WLAN) standards. As Richard Suttmeier and his
collaborators describe:
In November 2003 Beijing announced that China’s indigenously
developed encryption standard for wireless communication was
being adopted as a “national standard” to which, in the future, all
wireless devices sold in China would need to adhere. This WLAN
Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) standard was
reportedly developed to overcome known security problems with the
existing, widely used 802.11x “wi-fi” standard developed by the IEEE.
Beijing announced that the technology supporting the standard was
to be protected and made available only to a limited number of
Chinese companies. Gaining access to the technology, which is
necessary for meeting the standard, not only would require that
foreign firms partner with Chinese firms but would also increase the
chances that valuable intellectual property would diffuse to the
Chinese partners.193

Chinese efforts to persuade foreign manufacturers to build WAPI into
their products failed,194 as did attempts to have WAPI recognized by
ISO (which had already recognized the widely used Wi-Fi WLAN
standard produced by IEEE).195 Today, the WAPI standard remains
mandatory for mobile devices sold in China, though reports state that
it is rarely used even within the country.196
Thus, by the mid-2000s, Chinese technology vendors, which were
eager to expand into international markets, realized that they could
not effectively participate in those markets with products that
implemented only Chinese standards, while Chinese consumers began
to demand networks capable of supporting devices produced by
premier foreign suppliers such as Apple.197 This shift resulted in a

193. Suttmeier et al., supra note 182, at 50–51.
194. See Sumner Lemon, No Compromise on WAPI as Intel’s Barrett Heads to China,
INFOWORLD (Apr. 5, 2004, 6:54 AM), https://www.infoworld.com/article/2667069/
no-compromise-on-wapi-as-intel-s-barrett-heads-to-china.html
[https://perma.cc/
7E37-H7BQ] (reporting Intel’s refusal to offer chips that would support China’s WAPI
standard).
195. See Suttmeier et al., supra note 182, at 52.
196. Jacob Schindler, Beijing IP Court Slaps Sony Mobile with Injunction Based on SEP
Infringement, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.iam-media.com/
frandseps/beijing-ip-court-slaps-sony-mobile-injunction-based-sep-infringement
[hereinafter Schindler, Beijing IP Court].
197. E.g., Xin Haiguang, Why Are Chinese Consumers Crazy for Apple?, FORBES (June
11, 2012, 9:06 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insead/2012/06/11/why-are-
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dramatic increase in participation by Chinese vendors, led by Huawei,
in international standardization activities, and China’s desire to shape,
rather than receive, standards.198 Between 2004 and 2010, Chinese
attendance at IETF meetings, the principal international forum for
developing internet standards, increased from negligible levels to
levels that were second only to the United States and that far surpassed
that of Japan and South Korea.199 Chinese participation in ISO
technical committees and subcommittees also increased substantially
between 2006 and 2015.200 By 2010, Huawei, a frequent party to SEP
disputes, was already a member of 120 international standardization
bodies.201
Today, Chinese firms have become leaders in international
standardization efforts in technology areas ranging from autonomous
vehicles and lightbulbs to video encoding and 5G wireless
telecommunications.202 Huawei and other Chinese firms have secured
a growing number of leadership positions in influential international
SDOs203 and have declared increasing numbers of SEPs covering
international technology standards.204 Particularly in the area of 5G,
chinese-consumers-crazy-for-apple/?sh=4077e201a613
[https://perma.cc/HF7PQS3S] (translated by Aileen Huang).
198. ERNST, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION, supra note 182, at 103 (“China’s government
is very serious in its aspiration to move from [a] mere standard taker to a co-shaper,
and in some areas, a lead shaper of international standards.”); Seaman, supra note 184,
at 10–19 (discussing China’s evolution from a standards taker to a standards maker).
199. Jorge L. Contreras, Divergent Patterns of Engagement in Internet Standardization:
Japan, Korea and China, 38 TELECOMMS. POL’Y 914, 923–24 (2014) [hereinafter
Contreras, Divergent Patterns].
200. Seaman, supra note 184, at 20–21.
201. ERNST, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION, supra note 182, at 52.
202. See Valentina Pop et al., From Lightbulbs to 5G, China Battles West for Control of
Vital Technology Standards, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2021, 12:37 AM), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/from-lightbulbs-to-5g-china-battles-west-for-control-of-vitaltechnology-standards-11612722698; Matt Sheehan, Standards Bearer? A Case Study of
China’s Leadership in Autonomous Vehicle Standards, MARCOPOLO (June 3, 2021),
https://macropolo.org/analysis/standards-bearer-a-case-study-of-chinas-leadershipin-autonomous-vehicle-standards [https://perma.cc/9UN2-QWYY]; Dan Strumpf,
Where China Dominates in 5G Technology, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2019, 10:05 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/where-china-dominates-in-5g-technology11551236701.
203. Contreras, Divergent Patterns, supra note 199, at 927–28; Justus Baron & Olia
Kanevskaia, Global Competition for Leadership Positions in Standards Development
Organizations 1–2 (Mar. 31, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3818143.
204. DIETER ERNST, CHINA’S STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS CHALLENGE: FROM
LATECOMER TO (ALMOST) EQUAL PLAYER? 10–11 (2017), https://www.cigionline.org/
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Huawei has, by some counts, declared more SEPs than any other firm
in the world.205 Its new prominence in the standards and SEP arena has
made the resolution of FRAND disputes a priority for China.206
B. SEP and FRAND Disputes in China
As discussed in the previous Section, the 2010s saw a number of
global SEP disputes involving actions in the United States, Europe,
Japan, and other jurisdictions. Similar cases arose in China. These
cases include Conversant v. Huawei and ZTE,207 Huawei v. InterDigital,208
Vringo, Inc. v. ZTE Corp.,209 Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc.,210 Iwncomm v.
Sony,211 and Optis Wireless Technology, LLC v. Huawei Device Co.212 Because
the limited length of this Article does not allow for an in-depth
discussion of all of these cases,213 this Section focuses on Conversant’s
litigation due to its relevance to the emergence of ASIs in China.

static/documents/documents/China's%20Patents%20ChallengeWEB.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SMK3-RSEM]; Contreras, Divergent Patterns, supra note 199, at 924–25.
205. See Jacob Schindler, Huawei, Samsung and LG Are Top Owners of ‘Core’ 5G Patents
So Far, New Study Claims, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (June 2, 2020), https://www.iammedia.com/frandseps/new-essentiality-study-shows-huawei-samsung-and-lg-are-topowners-of-core-5g-patents; Strumpf, supra note 202.
206. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
207. Huawei Techs. Co. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. [2019] EWCA
(Civ) 38 (Eng.).
208. See Sokol & Zheng, supra note 184, at 88–89.
209. No. 14-cv-4988(LAK), 2015 WL 3498634 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2015).
210. No. 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD, 2017 WL 3966944, at *18 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7,
2017) (denying Qualcomm’s motion for an ASI).
211. Xi’an Xidian Jietong Wuxian Wangluo Tongxin Gufen Youxian Gongsi Yu
Suoni Yidong Tongxin Chanpin (Zhongguo) Youxian Gongsi Zhuanli Qinquan Jiufen
An (西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司与索尼移动通信产品(中国)有限公司专利侵权纠
纷案) [Xi’an Xidian Jietong Wireless Network Commc’n Co. (Iwncomm) v. Sony

Mobile Commc’ns Prods. (China) Co.], (2015) Jing Zhi Min Chu No. 1194 ((2015)京
知民初1194号) (Beijing Intell. Prop. Ct. Mar. 22, 2017), aff’d, (2017) Jing Min Zhong

No. 454 ((2017)京民终454号) (Beijing High People’s Ct. Mar. 28, 2018); see also
Schindler, Beijing IP Court, supra note 196 (discussing the Iwncomm ruling).
212. No. 2:17-cv-123-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 476054 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2018).
213. See generally Zhao Qishan & Lu Zhe, Chinese Courts Step into the SEP Space, INTELL.
ASSET MGMT. (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/chinese-courtsstep-the-sep-space (providing statistics and detailed information regarding SEP cases
in China from 2011 to 2019).
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Conversant is a Luxembourg-domiciled patent assertion entity that
has its principal operations in Canada and the United States.214 It
acquired from Nokia a portfolio of patents that have been declared
essential to ETSI standards in forty countries.215 For several years,
Conversant engaged in negotiations to license this global portfolio of
SEPs to Huawei and ZTE, two Chinese mobile device manufacturers
with global operations.216
In July 2017, Conversant asserted four U.K. SEPs against Huawei and
ZTE, requesting the High Court determine the FRAND terms for a
license of its global portfolio of patents covering the ETSI standards.217
Concurrently, ZTE brought an action in the Shenzhen Intermediate
People’s Court requesting a determination of the FRAND royalty rate
for Conversant’s Chinese patents and a declaration that Conversant’s
prior licensing offers violated its FRAND commitments.218 ZTE also
sought an injunction to prevent Conversant from engaging in “unfair,
unreasonable, discriminatory overpricing and other acts which are in
violation of the FRAND principle,” including the continuation of the
English proceedings and a finding of liability against Conversant for
such acts.219
In response, Conversant alleged in the English court that ZTE’s
pleadings in the Shenzhen case “directly attacked, and sought relief in
respect of, the proceedings before [that] court . . . and sought to block
and frustrate the English [p]roceedings.”220 Accordingly, Conversant
requested an ASI barring ZTE from prosecuting its conflicting claims
in Shenzhen.221 Soon thereafter, ZTE amended its Shenzhen
complaint “to remove all claims for liability which might involve . . .
damages or other financial relief . . . other than in relation to the
FRAND rate and FRAND licence terms for [Conversant’s] Chinese
[p]atents.”222
The English court explained that the test for granting an ASI
depended on whether the foreign claims “were vexatious, in that they
214. Huawei Techs. Co. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. [2019] EWCA
(Civ) 38 [7] (Eng.).
215. Id. at [6]–[7].
216. Id. at [10].
217. Id. at [3], [18]–[20].
218. Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2018] EWHC
(Ch) 2549 [10], [12] (Eng.).
219. Id. at [12(ii)], [12(v)] (emphasis omitted).
220. Id. at [11].
221. Id.
222. Id. at [18].
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sought to obstruct, or could have had the effect of obstructing,
pending proceedings before the English court; or of undermining or
frustrating the performance of a judgement given by the English
court.”223 The court noted that, under the English test, the elements
that ZTE had recently deleted from its Shenzhen complaint would
have justified an ASI.224 However, no such injunction was required
because the offending portions of the complaint had already been
removed.225
On appeal, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, though not
addressing the Chancery Division’s ASI ruling, rejected Huawei’s and
ZTE’s forum non conveniens challenge to the jurisdiction of the
English courts to establish global FRAND rates.226
Separately, in January 2018, Huawei brought an action in the
Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court, seeking a declaration that it did
not infringe three of Conversant’s Chinese patents and, if it did, it was
entitled to a license on FRAND terms.227 In September 2019, the
Nanjing court declined to issue a declaration regarding infringement
but established a top-down FRAND royalty for the three Conversant
patents—a decision widely heralded as China’s first top-down FRAND
royalty determination.228

223. Id. at [24] (citing Aerospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871 (PC) [892]–[897]
(Eng.) and Airbus v. Patel [1999] 1 AC 119 (HL) [133]–[140] (Eng.)).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Huawei Techs. Co. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. [2019] EWCA
(Civ) 38 [120], [127] (Eng.).
227. Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Yu Kangwensen Wuxian Xuke Youxian Gongsi
Queren Bu Qinhai Zhuanliquan Jiufen An (华为技术有限公司与康文森无线许可有限公司
确认不侵害专利权纠纷案) [Huawei Techs. Co. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing
S.A.R.L.], (2019) Zuigao Fa Zhi Min Zhong 732, 733, 734-1 ((2019)最高法知民终732、
733、734号之一) (Sup. People’s Ct. Aug. 28, 2020) [hereinafter Huawei Techs. (SPC)],
translated
at
https://patentlyo.com/media/2020/10/Huawei-V.-Conversantjudgment-translated-10-17-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/W65M-Q5XJ]; see also Top 10
Typical Technology-Related IP Cases of the Intellectual Property Court of the Supreme People’s
Court in 2020, SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. (Apr. 26, 2021, 9:24 PM), https://ipc.court.gov.cn/enus/news/view-1226.html [https://perma.cc/H564-K9ZC].
228. See Jacob Schindler, Nanjing Judge Sets Chinese SEP Rate in Dispute Between
Conversant and Huawei, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.iammedia.com/frandseps/nanjing-judge-sets-chinese-sep-rate-in-dispute-betweenconversant-and-huawei; see also Alexandra P. Yang, Inside China’s First Top-Down FRAND
Royalty Decision, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.iam-media.com/
frandseps/inside-chinas-first-top-down-frand-royalty-decision.
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C. China’s 2020 Shift Toward ASIs
In April 2018, a U.S. court in Huawei Technologies Co. v. Samsung
Electronics Co., granted an ASI that enjoined the parties from pursuing
an action in a Chinese court.229 A few months later, the UK court in
Conversant, discussed in the previous Section, also indicated that it
would have granted an ASI had Huawei not amended its claims in a
Chinese proceeding.230 In the face of these intrusions, or potential
intrusions, on China’s judicial sovereignty, it is understandable why
Chinese courts were eager to look for their own ASI-like mechanism.
For more than a decade, commentators in China have explored the
idea of introducing ASIs in the country.231 During the National
People’s Congress in May 2020, Justice Luo Dongchuan, the President
of the Intellectual Property Court of the Supreme People’s Court
(SPC), took the debate to the next level by advancing a series of
proposals to strengthen China’s judicial procedures.232 Among his
proposals was the expansion of China’s act preservation system to
achieve effects similar to ASIs in foreign jurisdictions.233 Without such
an expansion, he indicated, China would find it difficult to compete
with other international dispute resolution fora.234
Chinese courts seemingly took Justice Luo’s proposals and related
commentary to heart. In 2020, Chinese courts issued five ASIs in
international FRAND disputes. This Section discusses each case in
turn.
1.

Conversant v. Huawei and ZTE
The dispute between Conversant and Huawei and ZTE gave rise to
two separate ASIs in China. In addition to the U.K. matters discussed
229. Huawei Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 16-cv-02787, 2018 WL 1784065,
at *4, *12 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018); see discussion supra Section II.D.
230. Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2018] EWHC
(Ch) 2549 [24] (Eng.).
231. See infra text accompanying notes 329–33.
232. See Jacob Schindler, China’s Top IP Judge Suggests Mechanisms for Anti-Suit
Injunctions Needed, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (June 26, 2020), https://www.iam-media.com/
copyright/chinas-top-ip-judge-suggests-mechanisms-anti-suit-injunctions-needed
[hereinafter Schindler, China’s Top IP Judge]; SPC Vice President Luo Dongchuan Proposes
Enhanced Damages to Tackle with IP Infringement with Malice, SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. (July 22,
2020, 10:28 AM), https://ipc.court.gov.cn/en-us/news/view-425.html [https://
perma.cc/KJW6-GVCA] [hereinafter SPC Vice President Proposes Damages].
233. Schindler, China’s Top IP Judge, supra note 232; SPC Vice President Proposes
Damages, supra note 232.
234. Schindler, China’s Top IP Judge, supra note 232.
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above,235 Conversant sued Huawei and ZTE in the District Court of
Düsseldorf in Germany in April 2018, alleging infringement of several
European patents.236 On August 27, 2020, the Düsseldorf court granted
Conversant an injunction against Huawei’s and ZTE’s sale, use, or
importation in Germany of devices infringing one of Conversant’s
German SEPs.237
On the same day, in response to Conversant’s appeal of the Nanjing
court’s FRAND rate judgement, Huawei petitioned the SPC for an “act
preservation” ruling (which we will refer to from now on as an ASI) to
prevent Conversant from enforcing the Düsseldorf injunction until the
conclusion of the Chinese proceedings.238 The SPC granted the ASI
the next day,239 after an ex parte hearing in which Conversant did not
participate.240 In its decision, the SPC cited a number of factors
weighing in favor of granting the ASI, many of which resemble the
factors considered by U.S. courts.241 First, it established that the parties
to the Chinese and German actions were the same, and there was some
overlap between the subject matter of the cases.242 The SPC then found
235. Huawei Techs. Co. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. [2019] EWCA
(Civ) 38 (Eng.); Conversant Wireless Licensing [2018] EWHC (Ch) 2549.
236. Mathieu Klos, Conversant Wins in Germany with EIP Against Huawei and ZTE, JUVE
PATENT (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.juve-patent.com/news-and-stories/cases/
conversant-wins-in-germany-with-eip-against-huawei-and-zte
[https://perma.cc/
5AWD-87ZZ] [hereinafter Klos, Conversant Wins].
237. Landgericht Düsseldorf [LG] [District Court of Düsseldorf], Aug. 27, 2020, 4b
O 30/18, paras. 17–19, 66, 124 (Ger.), https://www3.hhu.de/duesseldorferarchiv/?p=8586; see Klos, Conversant Wins, supra note 236; Richard Lloyd, Following Big
UK Win, Conversant Seals Injunction Against ZTE and Huawei in German Suit, INTELL.
ASSET MGMT. (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/after-big-ukwin-conversant-seals-injunction-against-zte-and-huawei-in-german-suit. The matter
concerned Conversant’s European patent EP1797659. Lloyd, supra.
238. Huawei Techs. (SPC), supra note 227.
239. Id.; see Zhao Bing, China’s Supreme Court Orders Conversant Not to Enforce German
Injunction Against Huawei, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.iammedia.com/frandseps/chinas-supreme-court-orders-conversant-not-enforce-germaninjunction-against-huawei.
240. Because the ASI was issued ex parte, Conversant was entitled to apply for
reconsideration within five days. Cohen, China’s Evolving Case, supra note 1. It did so,
and its request was denied on September 11, leaving the ASI in force. Id.
241. Huawei Techs. (SPC), supra note 227 (listing among the factors for
consideration the impact of the respondent’s application for enforcing a foreign
judgement on litigation in China, the necessity of granting an act preservation
measure, the interests of the parties, the harm to the public interest, and international
comity); see Cohen, China’s Evolving Case, supra note 1; Yu & Contreras, supra note 20;
see also discussion supra Section II.D.
242. Huawei Techs. (SPC), supra note 227.
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that Conversant’s enforcement of the German injunction would
interfere with the Chinese action.243 In the court’s view, to avoid the
effects of the German injunction, Huawei would be forced to either
withdraw from the German market or accept the license offered by
Conversant in Germany, which established a global FRAND royalty that
was more than eighteen times higher than the rate set by the Nanjing
court.244 In contrast, the issuance of the ASI in China, the SPC
explained, would not materially prejudice Conversant’s rights in
Germany with respect to any merits decision of the German court.245
Finally, the Court found that the ASI would not harm the public
interest or adversely affect international comity.246 Upon entry of the
ASI, the SPC established a penalty of RMB one million per day (over
US $140,000) for any violation by Conversant.247
Like Huawei, ZTE sought an ASI in the Shenzhen Intermediate
People’s Court to prevent Conversant’s enforcement of a German
injunction against it.248 The Shenzhen court issued an ASI in
September 2020.249 Because Conversant and ZTE settled their dispute
over the FRAND royalty rate two months later,250 there is no further
opportunity for Chinese and German courts to address this dispute.

243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. Also relevant to the SPC’s decision, though not specifically included in its
consideration of the ASI, was the August 2018 ruling of the State Intellectual Property
Office of China (now the China National Intellectual Property Administration)
invalidating the Chinese counterpart to the German SEPs. Id.
248. See China’s Top 20 Patent Cases of 2020: ZTE v. Conversant, CHINA INTELL. PROP.
[hereinafter Top 20 Patent Cases], http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journalshow.asp?id=1787 [https://perma.cc/B7EN-C3FC]; Du Guodong & Liu Qiang,
Shenzhen Court Issues “Anti-Suit” Injunction in ZTE and Conversant SEP Licensing Dispute,
CHINA JUST. OBSERVER (June 20, 2021), https://www.chinajusticeobserver.com/a/
shenzhen-court-issues-anti-suit-injunction-in-zte-and-conversant-sep-licensing-dispute
[https://perma.cc/Z9VX-65SM].
249. Zhongxing Tongxun Gufen Youxian Gongsi Yu Kangwensen Wuxian Xuke
Youxian Gongsi Biaozhun Biyao Zhuanli Xuke Jiufen An (中兴通讯股份有限公司与康文
森无线许可有限公司标准必要专利许可纠纷案)

[ZTE Corp. v. Conversant Wireless
Licensing S.A.R.L.] (Shenzhen Interm. People’s Ct. Sept. 29, 2020); see Top 20 Patent
Cases, supra note 248; Du & Liu, supra note 248.
250. See Top 20 Patent Cases, supra note 248; Du & Liu, supra note 248.
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InterDigital v. Xiaomi251
The dispute between InterDigital, a U.S. entity, and Xiaomi, a
Chinese electronics firm, relates to five InterDigital SEPs covering the
3G and 4G standards. When licensing negotiations between the parties
broke down, Xiaomi sought a declaration by the Wuhan Intermediate
People’s Court of the appropriate FRAND royalty rate for the patents
on June 9, 2020.252
On July 29, InterDigital sued Xiaomi for infringement in the High
Court of Delhi in India, seeking monetary damages and an
injunction.253 In response, on August 4, Xiaomi asked the Wuhan court
to issue an ASI to prevent InterDigital from enforcing any injunction
issued by the Delhi court while the Wuhan proceeding was in
progress.254
The Wuhan court granted Xiaomi’s request, reasoning that
InterDigital’s initiation of parallel litigation in India showed a lack of
respect for the Wuhan court and the case before it.255 The Chinese
court also concluded that the Indian action was intended to interfere
with or obstruct the Wuhan case and would likely lead to a conflicting
ruling.256 Thus, the court concluded that the determination of a
FRAND royalty rate in India would likely cause significant harm to
Xiaomi.257 Because InterDigital, unlike Xiaomi, was a non-practicing
entity that did not make products but relied solely on licensing
income, the Wuhan court found that the issuance of an ASI would not
substantially harm InterDigital.258
Accordingly, on September 23, 2020, the Wuhan court ordered
InterDigital to withdraw its request for injunctive relief in India,
prohibited it from seeking injunctive relief in China or any other
2.

251. Xiaomi Tongxin Keji Youxian Gongsi Yu Jiaohu Shuzi Gongsi Biaozhun Biyao
Zhuanli Xuke Feilu Jiufen An (小米通信科技有限公司与交互数字公司标准必要专利许可费
率纠纷案) [Xiaomi Commc’n Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Tech. Corp.], (2020) E 01 Zhi

Min Chu No. 169-1 ((2020)鄂01知民初169号之一) (Wuhan Interm. People’s Ct. Sept.
23, 2020) [hereinafter Xiaomi Commc’n (Wuhan)], translated at https://patentlyo.com/
media/2020/10/Xiaomi-v.-InterDigital-decision-trans-10-17-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MNC-TBYD].
252. Id. at 5.
253. Interdigital Tech. Corp. v. Xiaomi Corp. (2020) 8772 I.A. [7], [15] (India).
254. Xiaomi Commc’n (Wuhan), supra note 251, at 2, 10.
255. Id. at 6–7.
256. Id. at 7, 9.
257. Id. at 7–8.
258. Id. at 8.
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country with respect to the 3G or 4G patents currently at issue in the
Wuhan case, and enjoined it from asking another court in China or
any other country to determine a FRAND royalty rate or resolve a
FRAND dispute relating to the 3G or 4G patents at issue.259 As in
Conversant v. Huawei, the Wuhan court established a penalty of RMB
one million per day for any violation of the ASI by InterDigital.260 But
unlike the ASI issued by the SPC in Conversant v. Huawei, the Wuhan
court’s ASI in InterDigital v. Xiaomi covered not only a specific foreign
action, but all pending and prospective foreign actions.261
In response to the Wuhan ASI, the Delhi court, on October 9, 2020,
issued an AASI preventing Xiaomi from enforcing its ASI against
InterDigital.262 The parties settled their dispute on August 3, 2021, by
agreeing to a multi-year, worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-bearing
license.263
OPPO v. Sharp264
In January 2020, Sharp—a Japanese operating subsidiary of the
manufacturing firm Hon Hai/Foxconn—sued Chinese handset
3.

259. Id. at 10–11.
260. Id.
261. Compare Huawei Techs. (SPC), supra note 227, with Xiaomi Commnc’n (Interm.
People’s Ct.), supra note 251. See generally Yu & Contreras, supra note 20 (commenting
on the broad scope of the ASI).
262. InterDigital Tech. Co. v. Xiaomi Corp. (2020) 8772 I.A. [79] (India); see also
Rajiv Choudhry, Delhi High Court Issues Anti Anti-Suit Injunction in InterDigital v. Xiaomi
Patent Infringement Dispute, SPICYIP (Oct. 12, 2020), https://spicyip.com/2020/10/
delhi-high-court-issues-anti-anti-suit-injunction-in-interdigital-v-xiaomi.html
[https://perma.cc/T2QY-S97X].
263. InterDigital, InterDigital Signs Licensing Agreement with Xiaomi, GLOBENEWSWIRE
(Aug. 3, 2021, 4:00 PM), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2021/08/
03/2273347/0/en/InterDigital-signs-licensing-agreement-with-Xiaomi.html
[https://perma.cc/SU3G-2DM5].
264. Xiapu Zhushi Huishe Yu OPPO Guangdong Yidong Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
Biaozhun Biyao Zhuanli Xuke Jiufen An (夏普株式会社与OPPO广东移动通信有限公司标
准必要专利许可纠纷案) [Sharp Corp. v. OPPO Guangdong Mobile Telecomms. Co.],

(2020) Zuigao Fa Zhi Min Xia Zhong No. 517 ((2020)最高法知民辖终517号) (Sup.
People’s Ct. Aug. 19, 2021) [hereinafter Sharp (SPC)], https://www.
chinaiplawupdate.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/2020-%E6%9C%80%E9%AB
%98%E6%B3%95%E7%9F%A5%E6%B0%91%E8%BE%96%E7%BB%88517%E5%8F%B7.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3FL-MCQC]; see also Cheng Zhongren, The
Chinese Supreme Court Affirms Chinese Court’s Jurisdiction Over Global Royalty Rates of
Standard-Essential Patents: Sharp v. Oppo, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (Jan. 3, 2022),
https://btlj.org/2022/01/the-chinese-supreme-court-affirms-chinese-courtsjurisdiction-over-global-royalty-rates-of-standard-essential-patents-sharp-v-oppo

2022]

TRANSPLANTING ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS

1583

manufacturer OPPO in the Tokyo District Court for infringement of
SEPs relating to several standards.265 Soon thereafter, OPPO brought
an action in the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court accusing
Sharp of violating its FRAND obligations and asking the court to set a
global FRAND rate for Sharp’s SEPs.266 Over Sharp’s objections, the
Shenzhen court held that it had jurisdiction over the matter on the
basis of OPPO’s operations in China and the implementation of the
patented standards in products sold in the country.267 The court also
indicated that its determination of a global FRAND rate could improve
efficiency, resolve the dispute between the parties, and avoid litigation
in multiple jurisdictions.268 In this regard, the Shenzhen court in OPPO
v. Sharp joined the U.K. court in Unwired Planet, seeking to establish a
global FRAND rate for the parties before it.269
Sharp responded to the filing in Shenzhen with additional claims in
Tokyo, as well as actions in the District Courts of Munich and
Mannheim in Germany.270 In the wake of these filings, OPPO sought
an ASI from the Shenzhen court to prevent Sharp from pursuing its
foreign actions before the conclusion of the Chinese proceeding.271

[https://perma.cc/DQ3A-7YK6] (discussing this case); Aaron Wininger, China’s
Supreme People’s Court Affirms Right to Set Royalty Rates Worldwide in OPPO/Sharp Standard
Essential
Patent
Case,
NAT’L
L.
REV.
(Sept.
5,
2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/china-s-supreme-people-s-court-affirms-rightto-set-royalty-rates-worldwide [https://perma.cc/Q67H-W953] (same).
265. Jacob Schindler, Sharp Sues Oppo in Japanese Court, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Jan.
31, 2020), https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/sharp-sues-oppo-in-japanesecourt.
266. See Zhao Bing, Sharp vs Oppo Patent Dispute Spreads to China and Germany, INTELL.
ASSET MGMT. (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/sharp-andoppo-patent-dispute-spreads-china-and-germany [hereinafter Zhao, Sharp vs Oppo].
267. Zhao Bing, Chinese Court to Set Global FRAND Rate in Oppo-Sharp Dispute, INTELL.
ASSET MGMT. (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/chinese-courtset-global-sep-portfolio-rate-in-oppo-sharp-dispute.
268. Sharp (SPC), supra note 264; see also Guangdong OPPO Mobile Telecommunications
Co. Ltd v. Sharp Corp. OPPO, CHINA JUST. OBSERVER (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.
chinajusticeobserver.com/law/x/guangdong-oppo-mobile-telecommunications-vsharp-corp-20201016 [https://perma.cc/63Y5-KKBP].
269. [2020] UKSC 37 (Eng.).
270. Zhao, Sharp vs Oppo, supra note 266.
271. Xiapu Zhushi Huishe Yu OPPO Guangdong Yidong Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
Biaozhun Biyao Zhuanli Xuke Jiufen An (夏普株式会社与OPPO广东移动通信有限公司标
准必要专利许可纠纷案) [Sharp Corp. v. OPPO Guangdong Mobile Telecomms. Co.],

(2020) Yue 03 Min Chu No. 689-1 ((2020)粤03民初689号) (Shenzhen Interm. People’s
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The Shenzhen court granted the ASI, imposing a penalty of RMB one
million per day for any violation of the injunction by Sharp.272
In response, Sharp sought an AASI from the Munich court to
prevent OPPO from enforcing the ASI by the Shenzhen court.273 The
Munich court granted the AASI a mere seven hours after entry of the
Shenzhen ASI.274 The Shenzhen court, however, found that Sharp’s
request for an AASI from the Munich court constituted a breach of the
ASI in China. Rather than face the penalty of that breach, Sharp
voluntarily and unconditionally withdrew its AASI request from the
Munich court.275
In an April 2021 report, the SPC highlighted OPPO and Huawei v.
Conversant as the two cases that had portrayed China’s evolution from
a “follower” of international intellectual property rules to a “guide”
who helps shape these rules (yindaozhe).276 Four months later, the SPC
upheld the Shenzhen court’s ruling in OPPO, noting the parties’
Ct. Dec. 3, 2020), aff’d, (2020) Zuigao Fa Zhi Min Xia Zhong No. 517 ((2020)最高法知
民辖终517号) (Sup. People’s Ct. Aug. 19, 2021).

272. Id.
273. Mark Cohen, Three SPC Reports Document China’s Drive to Increase Its Global Role
on IP Adjudication, CHINA IPR (May 5, 2021), https://chinaipr.com/2021/05/05/
three-spc-reports-document-chinas-drive-to-increase-its-global-role-on-ip-adjudication
[https://perma.cc/H3GC-89H8] [hereinafter Cohen, Three SPC Reports].
274. Id.; Huang Zeyu, The Latest Development on Antisuit Injunction Wielded by Chinese
Courts to Restrain Foreign Parallel Proceedings, CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET (July 9, 2021),
https://conflictoflaws.net/2021/the-latest-development-on-anti-suit-injunctionwielded-by-chinese-courts-to-restrain-foreign-parallel-proceedings/?print=pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z4HY-MFH5] [hereinafter Huang, Latest Development].
275. See Cohen, Three SPC Reports, supra note 273; Huang, Latest Development, supra
note 274.
276. See Guanyu Yinfa 2020 Nian Zhongguo Fayuan Shida Zhishichanquan Anjian
He Wushi Jian Dianxing Zhishichanquan Anli De Tongzhi, Faban [2021] Yi Si Liu Hao
(关于印发2020年中国法院10大知识产权案件和50件典型知识产权案例的通知, 法办【2021】146号)
[Notice of the Publication of the Top 10 Intellectual Property Cases and 50 Typical
Intellectual Property Cases Decided by Chinese Courts in 2020, Legal Notice No. 146
[2021]] (issued by the Gen. Off. Sup. People’s Ct., Apr. 16, 2021) [hereinafter Top 10
IP Cases], http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-297991.html [https://perma.cc/
JSW5-6BF2]. For discussions of how China is slowly moving from a norm taker to a
norm shaker or norm maker, see generally Henry Gao, China’s Ascent in Global Trade
Governance: From Rule Taker to Rule Shaker and Maybe Rule Maker?, in MAKING GLOBAL
TRADE GOVERNANCE WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES AND PRIORITIES FROM
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 153 (Carolyn Deere Birkbeck ed., 2011); Peter K. Yu, The Rise
of China in the International Intellectual Property Regime, in HANDBOOK ON THE
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINA 424 (Zeng Ka ed., 2019); Peter K. Yu, The
Middle Kingdom and the Intellectual Property World, 13 OR. REV. INT’L L. 209 (2011).
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willingness to enter into a global SEP license, their participation in the
negotiations, and the fact that the SEP dispute was closely related to
China.277
4.

Ericsson v. Samsung
The final Chinese ASI case of 2020, Samsung Electronics Co. v.
Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson, with which we began this Article,
represents an important variant in the evolution of global FRAND
disputes. Though the case was litigated primarily in China and the
United States, neither party was based in either jurisdiction; Ericsson
and Samsung are headquartered in Sweden and South Korea,
respectively. The parties thus selected jurisdictions for litigation based
on procedural and substantive advantages, independent of any “home
court advantage.”
These procedural and substantive advantages are well-known among
industry players. For example, Chinese courts have earned a
reputation for setting FRAND royalty rates that are substantially lower
than rates determined by courts in other jurisdictions—a feature
attractive to product manufacturers but unattractive to SEP holders.278
In contrast, the bifurcated German adjudication system for patent
cases results in the nearly automatic issuance of permanent injunctions
after a finding of infringement, and before any determination of
patent validity, making Germany an attractive venue for SEP holders.279
Ericsson v. Samsung involved an existing SEP cross-license between
the two parties that was due to expire at the end of 2020.280 Given the
parties’ inability to agree on renewal terms and their prior litigation,
277. Sharp (SPC), supra note 264; see also Wininger, supra note 264; Zhao Bing,
Chinese Judges Can Set Global SEP Rates and Licence Terms, Supreme People’s Court Confirms,
INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Sept. 2, 2021), https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/
chinese-courts-can-set-global-sep-rate-and-licensing-terms-spc-confirms.
278. See Lee Jyh-An, Implementing the FRAND Standard in China, 19 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 37, 78–79 (2016); Sophia Tang, Anti-Suit Injunction Issued in China: Comity,
Pragmatism and Rule of Law, CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET (Sept. 27, 2020),
https://conflictoflaws.net/2020/anti-suit-injunction-issued-in-china-comitypragmatism-and-rule-of-law [https://perma.cc/V3XP-UX26]; Zhao Bing, China’s
Courts Deserve a Bigger Say in Global SEP Policy, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (May 29, 2021),
https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/china-courts-sep-disputes-zhao-saturdayopinion.
279. See, e.g., THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 245–46 (2013); Arno Riße, Injunctions in Germany, in PATENT LAW
INJUNCTIONS 63, 63 (Rafał Sikorski, ed., 2019).
280. Ericsson Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 20-CV-00380, 2021 WL 89980 (E.D.
Tex. Jan. 11, 2021).
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Samsung, on December 7, filed a complaint in the Wuhan
Intermediate People’s Court, asking it to determine a global FRAND
royalty rate for the SEPs held by Ericsson.281 On December 11, Ericsson
filed an infringement action against Samsung in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas.282
In response, on December 14, Samsung requested that the Wuhan
court issue an ASI preventing Ericsson from seeking relief in the
United States or elsewhere on the asserted SEPs during the pendency
of the Wuhan action.283 The Wuhan court expeditiously issued an
order on December 25 that included both an ASI and an AAASI,284
prohibiting Ericsson from taking actions to negate the ASI while
imposing a penalty of RMB one million per day for noncompliance.285
Like the ASI issued by the Wuhan court in InterDigital v. Xiaomi, the
ASI in Ericsson v. Samsung was of global scope, covering actions in the
United States and other countries.286
On December 28, Ericsson sought a temporary restraining order
(effectively an AASI) from the U.S. court to prevent Samsung from
interfering with Ericsson’s right to assert the full scope of its patent
rights in the United States.287 The U.S. court granted Ericsson’s request
on the same day and issued a preliminary injunction against Samsung’s
enforcement of the Chinese ASI on January 11, 2021.288 In addition to
prohibiting Samsung from enforcing the Chinese order, the U.S.
court’s AASI also required Samsung to indemnify Ericsson against any
penalties the Chinese court levied against Ericsson for violation of the
ASI.289 While the appeal in the matter was pending before the Federal
Circuit, Ericsson brought further actions against Samsung in the
United Kingdom and before the U.S. International Trade

281. Id. at *1.
282. Id.
283. Id. at *2.
284. Samsung Elecs. (Wuhan), supra note 2; see Mathieu Klos, China Wakes up in Global
SEP Litigation, JUVE PATENT (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.juve-patent.com/news-andstories/legal-commentary/china-wakes-up-in-global-sep-litigation [https://perma.cc/
R9YY-QET9].
285. Samsung Elecs. (Wuhan), supra note 2; Ericsson, 2021 WL 89980, at *2–3.
286. Xiaomi Commnc’n (Wuhan), supra note 251; Samsung Elecs. (Wuhan), supra note
2.
287. Ericsson, 2021 WL 89980.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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Commission.290 The parties, however, settled their worldwide disputes
shortly thereafter.291 The remarkably rapid actions and counteractions
in this case exemplify the worst features of the “race to the courthouse”
described in Section II.C.292
5.

AASIs issued against potential Chinese ASIs
The issuance of ASIs by Chinese courts in 2020 attracted significant
international attention from administrative bodies293 and courts in
Europe and the United States. As discussed above, courts in Germany,
India, and the United States have issued AASIs to prohibit the
enforcement of Chinese ASIs.294
More recently, the District Courts of Düsseldorf and Munich in
Germany issued AASIs to pre-emptively prevent parties from seeking
ASIs in Chinese courts in the future.295 According to one report, the
Munich court issued an AASI against Huawei given the mere
likelihood “that Huawei will file an anti-suit injunction with a Chinese
court in order to prevent [the opposing party] from making SEP claims
in Germany.”296 Likewise, in Düsseldorf, three SEP holders sought an
AASI against Xiaomi based on “the prevalent trend of Chinese
companies filing ASIs.”297
Taken together, these actions suggest that foreign courts have come
to view Chinese ASIs as threats to their own jurisdiction. Table 1 below
illustrates the emergence of China in 2020 as an issuer of ASIs in global
FRAND litigation and the global response to these ASIs.
290. Id.; Certain Electronic Devices with Wireless Connectivity, Components
Thereof, and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-1245, USITC (Feb. 2, 2021)
(Notice); Osborne-Crowley, supra note 13.
291. Jacob Schindler, Samsung and Ericsson Settle Patent Licensing Dispute, INTELL.
ASSET MGMT. (May 7, 2021), https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/samsung-andericsson-settle-patent-licensing-dispute.
292. See supra text accompanying note 140.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 25–34 (discussing U.S. and EU reactions to
Chinese ASIs).
294. See discussion supra Sections III.C.2, III.C.3, III.C.4.
295. See Mathieu Klos, Munich Regional Court Upholds AASI Application Against
Huawei, JUVE PATENT (June 30, 2021), https://www.juve-patent.com/news-andstories/cases/munich-regional-court-upholds-aasi-application-against-huawei
[https://perma.cc/7EUR-USJ8] [hereinafter Klos, Munich Regional Court]; Amy
Sandys, Düsseldorf on New Ground with Partial AASI Against Xiaomi, JUVE PATENT (July
20, 2021), https://www.juve-patent.com/news-and-stories/cases/dusseldorf-on-newground-with-partial-aasi-against-xiaomi [https://perma.cc/5Q8W-KB7V].
296. Klos, Munich Regional Court, supra note 295.
297. Sandys, supra note 295.

1588

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1537

Table 1: ASIs in SEP Disputes 2012–2021

IV. ASI AS A NEW FORM OF LEGAL TRANSPLANT IN CHINA
Parts II and III document the use of ASIs in both source and
recipient jurisdictions as well as the growing global international
jurisdictional battles over SEPs and FRAND licensing. This Part takes a
closer look at the transplantation of ASIs in China. Arguing that this
procedural mechanism represents a new form of legal transplant in the
country, this Part identifies the internal and external forces driving
China’s recent effort to adapt a foreign procedural mechanism. This
Part further interrogates the appropriateness of calling this
mechanism a legal transplant, the mechanism’s distinctive features
(when compared with other recent legal transplants in the
pharmaceutical area), and its potential domestic and global
ramifications.
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A. Local Roots and Emergence
1.

Basic contours of injunctive mechanisms
Thus far, China has not enacted new laws or regulations to create an
ASI mechanism.298 Nevertheless, some injunctive mechanisms have
existed in the country since 2000. To some extent, these mechanisms
perform the same functions as the ASIs issued by courts in the United
Kingdom, the United States, and other jurisdictions. To outline the
basic contours of injunctive mechanisms in China, this Section focuses
on three distinct legal domains: intellectual property law, maritime
law, and civil procedure law.
a. Intellectual property law
The Patent Law was enacted in 1984 and has since been amended in
1992, 2000, 2008, and 2020.299 When the law was amended in 2000,
shortly before China entered the WTO, Article 61 was added to provide
Western-style preliminary injunctions,300 as required by Article 44 of
the TRIPS Agreement.301 Article 61 reads:

298. Interspersed among a variety of laws, regulations, and judicial interpretations
are rules dealing with how to tackle transnational parallel civil litigation. One of the
earliest rules of this kind is Article 15 of the Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Some
Issues Concerning the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China,
which provides:
If one party is a Chinese citizen residing abroad and the other a Chinese
citizen residing in China, no matter which party files a divorce lawsuit with the
people’s court, the people’s court at the place where the party resides in China
has the jurisdiction over the lawsuit. If the party residing abroad files a lawsuit
with the court at his or her country of residence and the party residing in
China files a lawsuit with the people’s court, the people’s court with which the
lawsuit is filed has the jurisdiction over the lawsuit.
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong <Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi
Susong Fa> Ruogan Wenti De Yijian, Fashi [1992] Ershi’er Hao (最高人民法院关于适用
《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》若干问题的意见, 法释【1992】22号) [Opinions of the

Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application of the Civil
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, Judicial Interpretation No. 22
[1992]] (promulgated by the Judicial Comm. Sup. People’s Ct., July 14, 1992, effective
July 14, 1992), art. 15, http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=6690&lib= law&
SearchKeyword=Civil [https://perma.cc/M3MA-NLTX].
299. 2020 Patent Law, supra note 91; 2008 Patent Law, supra note 89; 2000 Patent
Law, supra note 78; 1992 Patent Law, supra note 78; 1984 Patent Law, supra note 73.
300. 2000 Patent Law, supra note 78, art. 61.
301. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 28, art. 44.
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Where any patentee or interested party has evidence to prove that
another person is infringing or will soon infringe its or his patent
right and that if such infringing act is not checked or prevented from
occurring in time, it is likely to cause irreparable harm to it or him,
it or he may, before any legal proceedings are instituted, request the
people’s court to adopt measures for ordering the suspension of
relevant acts and the preservation of property.302

Notwithstanding the provision’s subsequent amendments in 2008 and
2020,303 which altered some of the language used, the provision’s
inherent thrust remains substantially unchanged. That provision (now
renumbered Article 72) also retains the legal nomenclature of
“preservation measures,” as opposed to “injunctions.”304 Similar
provisions can be found in copyright305 and trademark laws,306 both of
which were amended around the same time shortly before China
joined the WTO.
In February 2004, the SPC issued a noteworthy judicial
interpretation, implicitly confirming the injunctive nature of
preservation measures in intellectual property law.307 As the court
stated:
302. 2000 Patent Law, supra note 78, art. 61.
303. This article was revised and renumbered Article 66 in 2008 and Article 72 in
2020. 2008 Patent Law, supra note 89, art. 66; 2020 Patent Law, supra note 91, art. 72.
304. 2000 Patent Law, supra note 78, art. 61; 2020 Patent Law, supra note 91, art. 72.
305. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa (中华人民共和国著作权法)
[Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended Oct. 27, 2001, effective Nov. 1,
2001), art. 49. This provision was revised and renumbered Article 50 in 2010 and
Article 56 in 2020. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa (中华人民共和国著
作权法) [Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the

Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended Feb. 26, 2010, effective
Apr. 1, 2010), art. 50; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa (中华人民共和国
著作权法) [Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended Oct. 17, 2020, effective
June 1, 2021), art. 56.
306. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa (中华人民共和国商标法)
[Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, amended Oct. 27, 2001, effective Dec. 1,
2001), art. 57. This provision was revised and renumbered Article 65 in 2013 and
remained unchanged when the law was amended again in 2019. 2013 Trademark Law,
supra note 91, art. 65; 2019 Trademark Law, supra note 91, art. 65.
307. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Suqian Zeling Tingzhi Qinfan Zhuanliquan
Shangbiaoquan Zhuzuoquan Xingwei Anjian Bianhao He Shouqu Anjian Shoulifei
Wenti De Pifu, Fashi [2004] Shiqi Hao (最高人民法院关于诉前责令停止侵犯专利权、商标
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The cases involving pre-litigation orders to stop patent, trademark,
or copyright infringements fall within a new, independent category.
For the convenience of judicial statistics and to correctly indicate the
nature of the case, the document numbers for this type of case shall
be uniformly prefixed by the word jin.308

More recently, the SPC released a relatively comprehensive judicial
interpretation in 2018, with the aim of providing guidance on the
appropriate handling of the application of preservation measures,
particularly act preservation measures, in intellectual property cases.309
b. Maritime law
Maritime law is another legal domain in China that provides
injunctive measures. The Special Maritime Procedure Law was
adopted in December 1999 and came into force in July 2000.310
Chapter IV introduced a newly designed legal mechanism of maritime
injunction. Article 51 defined this injunction as follows:
A maritime injunction means the compulsory measures adopted on
the application of a maritime claimant by the maritime court to
compel the person against whom a claim is made to do or not to do
certain things, so as to prevent the lawful rights and interest of the
claimant from being infringed upon.311

权、著作权行为案件编号和收取案件受理费问题的批复, 法释【2004】17号) [Official Reply

of the Supreme People’s Court on the Issue Concerning the Document Number and
Case Acceptance Fee for Cases Involving Pre-Litigation Orders to Stop Patent,
Trademark, or Copyright Infringements, Judicial Interpretation No. 17 [2004]]
(issued by the Judicial Comm. Sup. People’s Ct., Feb. 16, 2004, effective Feb. 16, 2004),
https://www.pkulaw.com/en_law/6ac3eaa9e6137621bdfb.html [https://perma.cc/
65UT-8NBM].
308. Id. The word jin can be translated as “ban,” “forbid,” “prohibit,” or “enjoin.”
309. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shencha Zhishi Chanquan Jiufen Xingwei
Baoquan Anjian Shiyong Falü Ruogan Wenti De Guiding, Fashi [2018] Ershiyi Hao
(最高人民法院关于审查知识产权纠纷行为保全案件适用法律若干问题的规定, 法释【2018】21
号) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the

Applicable Law in the Review of Act Preservation Measures in Intellectual Property
Disputes, Judicial Interpretation No. 21 [2018]] (promulgated by the Judicial Comm.
Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 12, 2018, effective Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.
pkulaw.com/en_law/fff3c32a8e6a3fb1bdfb.html [https://perma.cc/J97X-PLEJ].
310. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Haishi Susong Tebie Chengxu Fa (中华人民共
和国海事诉讼特别程序法) [Special Maritime Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of

China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 25, 1999,
effective July 1, 2000).
311. Id. art. 51.
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The remedy provided by this provision is essentially the same as a
Western-style injunction. Yet, it is more limited in scope, as it applies
solely in the specialized field of maritime litigation.
c. Civil procedure law
The final legal domain, and one that is highly relevant to Chinese
courts when they issue ASIs, is civil procedure law. In August 2012, the
Civil Procedure Law, initially adopted in April 1991, was amended to
introduce a new mechanism of act preservation.312 Article 100 (now
renumbered Article 103313) provides, in pertinent part:
In the event that, because of the conduct of a party to the case or
any other reason, the judgement on the case may become difficult
to enforce or damage may be caused to the other party, the people’s
court may, upon the request of the said party, order the preservation
of the property of the other party, specific performance or
injunction; in the absence of such request, the people’s court, where
it deems necessary, may also order property preservation
measures.314

This provision remained unchanged when the law was amended in
June 2017 and more recently in December 2021.315 Since its
introduction, the act preservation mechanism has been in operation
for almost a decade. This mechanism works in tandem with the
longstanding mechanism of property preservation, which already
existed at the inception of the Civil Procedure Law in 1991.316 Taken
312. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法)
[Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, amended Aug. 31, 2012, effective
Jan. 1, 2013) [hereinafter 2012 Civil Procedure Law].
313. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法)
[Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, amended Dec. 24, 2021, effective
Jan. 1, 2022), art. 103 [hereinafter 2021 Civil Procedure Law].
314. 2012 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 312, art. 100.
315. 2021 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 313, art. 103; Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法) [Civil Procedure Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, amended June 27, 2017, effective July 1, 2017), art. 100.
316. See id. ch. 9 (covering property preservation and advance execution). Before
the law’s formal enactment in 1991, a comparable version operated for trial
implementation for almost a decade since March 1982. This provisional statute
included a chapter on property preservation as well. See Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (Shixing) (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法(试行)) [Civil
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together, these two sets of preservation measures represent a mixture
of piecemeal legal transplants from the former Soviet Union,
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.317 As one
commentator laments, “the drafters of the various Chinese laws in their
construction of the interim relief system lacked a unified macroconception.”318
In sum, two tiers of rules provide for injunctive mechanisms in
China: specific rules in the domains of intellectual property and
maritime laws and general rules in the domain of civil procedural law.
In the past two decades, these rules have played a critical role that is
fundamentally equivalent to those played by Western-style injunctions.
d. The introduction of an ASI-like remedy
With the arrival of the new millennium, the increase in economic
globalization, and its entry into the WTO, China became more
integrated with the global economy. As a result, an ever-growing
number of Chinese enterprises have engaged in overseas business
activities. At the same time, Chinese courts began to be confronted
with ASIs issued by foreign courts or arbitral bodies against the parties
appearing before them.319
The earliest ASIs issued by Chinese courts appeared in maritime
litigation.320 The SPC’s report on Conversant v. Huawei recounted two
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (For Trial Implementation)]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 8, 1982, effective
Oct. 1, 1982), ch. 23 (covering preservation measures in litigation).
317. See Zhou Cui (周翠), Xingwei Baoquan Wenti Yanjiu—Dui <Minshi Susong Fa> Di
100–105 Tiao De Jieshi (行为保全问题研究—对《民事诉讼法》第100–105条的解释) [Study
on Act Preservation: Interpretation of Articles 100–105 of the Civil Procedure Law], FALÜ
KEXUE (法律科学) [SCI. L.], no. 4, 2015, at 92, 92–93.
318. Id. at 93.
319. See, e.g., Xiamen Zhonghe Shiye Youxian Gongsi Yu Nisenkaiwen Youxian
Gongsi Haishang Huowu Yunshu Hetong Jiufen An (厦⻔中⽲实业有限公司与尼森凯文有
限公司海上货物运输合同纠纷案) [Xiamen Zhonghe Indus. Co. v. Nissen Kaiun Co.],
(2007) Xia Hai Fa Shang Chu No. 241 ((2007)厦海法商初241号) (Xiamen Mar. Ct.
2007); Shenzhen Shi Liangshi Jituan Youxian Gongsi Yu Meijingyienyi Gongsi Tidan
Yunshu Huowu Sunhai Jiufen An (深圳市粮食集团有限公司与美景伊恩伊公司提单运输货物
损害纠纷案) [Shenzhen Grain Group Co. v. Future E.N.E.], (2004) Qing Hai Fa Hai
Shang Chu No. 245 ((2004)青海法海商初245号) (Qingdao Mar. Ct. Nov. 20, 2004).
320. Zhongguo Zhishi Chanquan Shenpan Fachu De Shouli Jinsuling—Anjian
Heyiting Xiangjie Kangwensen Gongsi Yu Huawei Gongsi Biaozhun Biyao Zhuanli
Xuke Jiufen An (中国知识产权审判发出的⾸例禁诉令—案件合议庭详解康文森公司与华为公
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cases in this area. In May 2012, the Qingdao Maritime Court issued a
maritime injunction ordering the respondent to immediately release
the arrest of the applicant’s ship in Australia and to refrain from
arresting any of the applicant’s property or taking other obstructing
measures.321 In July 2017, the Wuhan Maritime Court issued a civil
ruling ordering the respondent to immediately apply to the High
Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to withdraw
the ASI.322 In both cases, the courts issued maritime injunctions to
prevent the parties from repeating the request for preservation
measures abroad.
These maritime injunctions paved the way for the development of
the act preservation mechanism in Article 100 of the Civil Procedure
Law. As one commentator observes:
The Civil Procedure Law specifically stipulates the conditions,
procedures, and legal consequences of act preservation so that the
maritime injunctions in maritime litigation can enjoy the procedural
protection of the Civil Procedure Law. It promotes the coherence
between the procedures for maritime and civil litigation and is

司标准必要专利许可纠纷案) [The First Anti-Suit Injunction Issued in a Chinese Intellectual

Property Case—A Detailed Explanation of the Conversant v. Huawei SEP Licensing Dispute
by the Collegial Panel], INTELL. PROP. CT. SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. (Feb. 26, 2021, 10:49 AM),
http://ipc.court.gov.cn/zh-cn/news/view-1056.html
[https://perma.cc/M2R8WWAG] [hereinafter First ASI Issued]; see also Li Xiaofeng (李晓枫), Lun Yi Woguo Xingwei
Baoquan Zhidu Shixian Jinsuling Gongneng (论以我国行为保全制度实现禁诉令功能) [Discussion
on the Use of Act Preservation System to Achieve the Functions of Anti-Suit Injunction], FAXUE
ZAZHI (法学杂志) [L. SCI. MAG.], no. 7, 2015, at 132, 135 (noting that the Chinese
courts’ early encounters with ASIs from foreign countries concentrated in the field of
maritime litigation). Chinese commentators frequently started the discussion of
maritime injunctions with the 2008 case involving Nanyuan Co. See Wang Juan (王娟),
Guanyu Woguo Yinru Jinsuling Zhidu De Sikao (关于我国引入禁诉令制度的思考) [Thoughts
on the Introduction of an Anti-Suit Injunction System in China], FAXUE PINGLUN (法学评论)
[L. REV.], no. 6, 2009, at 72, 72 [hereinafter Wang, Thoughts on ASI].
321. First ASI Issued, supra note 320; see also Atlasnavios Navegacao, LDA v. Ship “Xin
Tai Hai” (2012) 291 ALR 795 [3]–[8], [15]–[17] (Austl.) (discussing the proceedings
in China).
322. Huatai Caichan Baoxian Youxian Gongsi Shenzhen Fengongsi Yu Kelibo
Zuchuan Gongsi Chuanbo Zuyong Hetong Jiufen An (华泰财产保险有限公司深圳分公司
与克利伯租船公司船舶租用合同纠纷案) [Huatai Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clipper

Chartering SA], (2017) E 72 Xing Bao No. 3 ((2017)鄂72行保3号) (Wuhan Mar. Ct.
July 21, 2017).
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conducive to solving the problem of “difficult enforcement” (zhixing
nan) involving maritime injunctions.323

Justice Luo has also confirmed the experimental nature of maritime
injunctions and their significance for providing practical guidance to
the establishment of the act preservation mechanism in the Civil
Procedure Law.324
2.

Expanded use in SEP cases
In 2020, Chinese courts began issuing ASI-like remedies in SEP
cases. Because Section III.C offered an in-depth discussion of the five
specific cases that provided for such remedies, this Section focuses on
the local roots of the injunctive measures granted in those cases. At the
outset, it is worth noting that the SPC’s decision in Conversant v. Huawei
has attracted worldwide attention from judges, academics, and
practitioners. The People’s Court Daily, published by the SPC, also
included this case in its list of “Top Ten Cases of the People’s Court in
2020.”325 This selection was particularly notable considering that the
list was nationwide and included all areas of law, not just intellectual
property law.

323. Zheng Dengzhen (郑登振), <Minshi Susong Fa> Xiuding Dui Haishi Susong De
Yingxiang (《民事诉讼法》修订对海事诉讼的影响) [The Impact of the Revision of the Civil
Procedure Law on Maritime Litigation], ZHONGGUO HAISHANG FA YANJIU (中国海商法研究)
[CHINESE J. MAR. L.], no. 2, 2013, at 112, 114.
324. Luo Dongchuan (罗东川), Zhigua Yunfan Ji Canghai (直挂云帆济沧海)
[Hoisting a Full Sail to Navigate the Boundless Sea], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANGXUN (中国法
院网) CHINA CT. NET (Sept. 2, 2014), https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/
2014/09/id/1430591.shtml [https://perma.cc/HX9Q-D9XY].
325. As the People’s Court Daily reported:
The ten selected cases, including criminal, civil, and administrative cases, are
among those reported by this newspaper in 2020 that have major influence,
that are of wide concern to society, that reflect major breakthroughs in trial
results, and that play exemplary and leading roles in promoting public order
and good customs.
Dong Xingyu (董星雨), Benbao Pingchu 2020 Niandu Renmin Fayuan Shida Anjian
(本报评出2020年度人民法院十大案件) [The People’s Court Daily Has Selected the Top Ten
Cases of the People’s Court in 2020], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO (人民法院报) [PEOPLE’S CT.
DAILY] (Jan. 9, 2021), http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/html/2021-01/09/
content_175437.htm [https://perma.cc/33J8-2LSJ]. More recently, the SPC also
selected this case for its list of “Top 10 Intellectual Property Cases in 2020.” Top 10 IP
Cases, supra note 276.
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In its report on Conversant v. Huawei, the SPC noted:
This case was based on the act preservation system in Article 100 of
the Civil Procedure Law. It broadened the scope and boundary of
the application of the act preservation system in China and provided
the early steps of the path toward putting anti-suit injunctions in
Chinese judicial practice.326

Thus, even though China has not released any law, regulation, or
judicial interpretation to formally adopt ASIs,327 the 2020 case seems
to have set a guiding precedent for comparable cases in the future. It
is particularly noteworthy that the SPC used the term ASI (jinsuling) in
its report.328
In addition, the establishment of an ASI-like mechanism can find
theoretical and practical support from Chinese scholars and
practitioners. For more than a decade, scholars have put forward this
mechanism, emphasizing the necessity and rationality of its
establishment in China. As one commentator observed as early as 2007:
“In a case over which both the Chinese and foreign courts have
jurisdiction, if the foreign court has the means of issuing an anti-suit
injunction but the Chinese court does not, the lack thereof will
inevitably disadvantage the Chinese court in a jurisdictional battle.”329
This view, which was representative of Chinese scholars and
practitioners, is emblematic of the intention to protect the judicial
authority of domestic courts from being undercut by foreign courts.
Thus far, it appears that most Chinese scholars and judges in relevant

326. First ASI Issued, supra note 320.
327. An interesting contrast is the introduction of the forum non conveniens
doctrine in China. That doctrine was transplanted through a judicial interpretation
that the SPC promulgated in January 2015. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong
<Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa> De Jieshi, Fashi [2015] Wu Hao
(最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》的解释,
法释【2015】5号)
[Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of the Civil
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, Judicial Interpretation No. 5
[2015]] (promulgated by the Judicial Comm. Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 30, 2015, effective
Feb. 4, 2015), art. 532, https://www.pkulaw.com/en_law/82f91c0394dcdc
28bdfb.html [https://perma.cc/AW36-NEEK].
328. See First ASI Issued, supra note 320.
329. Zhang Limin (张利民), Guoji Minsu Zhong Jinsuling De Yunyong Ji Woguo Jinsuling
Zhidu De Goujian (国际民诉中禁诉令的运用及我国禁诉令制度的构建) [The Use of Anti-Suit
Injunctions in Transnational Civil Litigation and the Construction of the Anti-Suit Injunction
System in China], FAXUE (法学) [LEGAL SCI.], no. 3, 2007, at 122, 127.
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fields, including a senior SPC judge,330 agree and support the
establishment of an ASI mechanism.331
In sum, the SPC’s issuance of an ASI in 2020 has buttressed the
judicial efforts to prophylactically halt potential SEP-related parallel
proceedings in competing judicial fora abroad. There is also a wide
range of theoretical and practical support for the formal introduction
of an ASI-like mechanism in China. In the future, it is likely that a
formal statutory basis—or, in the context of this Article, a legal
transplantation with clearly defined parameters—will be developed.
Until such development, however, there remains no formal statutory
basis for a western-style ASI under Chinese law.332 Nor is there an
institutional bar to issuing ASIs. Indeed, Chinese judges are already
authorized to use discretion to evaluate the appropriateness of such
issuance.333 They can do so mutatis mutandis as they see fit, based on
330. See, e.g., Shen Hongyu (沈红雨), Woguo Fa De Yuwai Shiyong Falü Tixi Goujian Yu
Shewai Minshangshi Susong Guanxiaquan Zhidu De Gaige—Jian Lun Bufangbian Fayuan
Yuanze He Jinsuling Jizhi De Goujian (我国法的域外适用法律体系构建与涉外民商事诉讼管辖
权制度的改革—兼论不方便法院原则和禁诉令机制的构建) [The Construction of a Legal System

for the Extraterritorial Application of Chinese Law and the Reform of the Jurisdiction System
Concerning Foreign-Related Civil and Commercial Litigation—and the Discussion of the Forum
Non Conveniens Principle and the Construction of the Anti-Suit Injunction Mechanism],
ZHONGGUO YINGYONG FAXUE (中国应用法学) [CHINA J. APPLIED JURIS.], no. 5, 2020, at
114, 126 (authored by the Deputy Chief Judge of the Fourth Civil Tribunal of the
Supreme People’s Court).
331. See, e.g., OU FUYONG, ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION 249–55 (2007); Peng Yi (彭奕), Woguo Neidi Shiyong Jinsuling Zhidu
Tanxi (我国内地适用禁诉令制度探析) [A Probe into a Suitable Anti-Suit Injunction System for
Mainland China], WUHAN DAXUE XUEBAO (ZHEXUE SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) (武汉大学学报(
哲学社会科学版)) [WUHAN U.J. (PHIL. & SOC. SCI. ED.)], no. 5, 2012, at 57; Wang,

Thoughts on ASI, supra note 320; Yao Jianjun (姚建军), Yingmei Faxi Guojia (Diqu) De
Jinsuling Zhidu Ji Dui Woguo De Jiejian (英美法系国家(地区)的禁诉令制度及对我国的借鉴)
[The Anti-Suit Injunction System in Common Law Countries (Regions) and Its Use as a
Reference for China], RENMIN SIFA (人民司法) [PEOPLE’S JUDICATURE], no. 1, 2011, at 102;
Zhu Jianjun (祝建军), Woguo Ying Jianli Chuli Biaozhun Biyao Zhuanli De Jinsuling Zhidu
(我国应建立处理标准必要专利争议的禁诉令制度) [China Should Establish an Anti-Suit
Injunction System to Handle SEP Disputes], ZHISHI CHANQUAN (知识产权) [INTELL. PROP.],
no. 6, 2020, at 25.
332. Other commentators have made this observation as well. Accord Tang, supra
note 278 (“Chinese law does not explicitly permit the courts to issue anti-suit or antiarbitration injunctions.”).
333. See id.
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factors that are typically weighed in cases that call for an act
preservation mechanism, broadly defined. Such an approach, to a
certain degree, reflects the need for and benefits of legal pragmatism.
As ASIs continue to develop in China, other factors may affect the
mechanism’s development trajectory. For instance, in June 2021,
China promulgated the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, which took effect
immediately.334 Although the law falls in the domain of public law and
was enacted to provide effective and adequate countermeasures
against foreign sanctions on China, some commentators have linked
this new law to the discussion of ASIs.335 It remains to be seen whether
the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law will be invoked in the SEP context or
in relation to ASIs in the future.
B. Are ASIs Legal Transplants?
Considering the availability of injunctive mechanisms under
Chinese intellectual property, maritime, and civil procedure laws, and
the legal basis for Chinese courts to issue ASIs in international FRAND
disputes, one could query whether ASIs are legal transplants. Based on
its local roots in China, the ASI could be classified as an indigenous
legal device that Chinese courts have adapted in response to foreign
legal actions. After all, ASIs are by their nature act preservation
mechanisms. These mechanisms have been part of the Civil Procedure
Law since 2012, and even earlier if one counts the 1999 Special
Maritime Procedure Law.336
Nevertheless, four reasons support the view that the ASI mechanism
is a legal transplant by China. First, as the SPC Intellectual Property
Court stated, the ASI is a new, sui generis form of act preservation
mechanism that was first created in the 2020 case of Conversant v.
Huawei.337 As noted in the previous Section, the Court specifically used
the term jinsuling (ASI) alongside xingwei baoquan (act preservation) in
its report on this case.338 This word choice strongly suggests that the
ASI is a foreign transplant that Chinese courts have operationalized
334. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Waiguo Zhicai Fa (中华人民共和国反外国制
裁法) [Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated

by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 10, 2021, effective June 10, 2021).
335. Cf. Mark Cohen, China’s New Blocking Statute Comes into Effect, CHINA IPR (June
11, 2021), https://chinaipr.com/2021/06/11/chinas-new-blocking-statute-comesinto-effect [https://perma.cc/XE7Z-BMWM].
336. See discussion supra Section IV.A.1.
337. See First ASI Issued, supra note 320.
338. Id.

2022]

TRANSPLANTING ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS

1599

through, and assimilated into, the act preservation mechanism
provided under Article 100 of the Civil Procedure Law.339
Second, Section II.D noted the different approaches taken by courts
in civil law jurisdictions, in particular their reluctance to issue ASIs and
their eagerness to issue AASIs to protect their own jurisdiction.340
Considering the civil law tradition in China and the Germanic roots of
its legal system,341 it is peculiar that Chinese courts did not follow the
continental European approach. Instead, these courts used the act
preservation mechanism creatively to achieve outcomes that ASIs
would generate in the United Kingdom, the United States, and other
common law jurisdictions.342 The Chinese courts’ willingness to
reorient a preexisting legal remedy to achieve a distinctive outcome is
another piece of evidence supporting the view that the ASI mechanism
is a legal transplant.
Third, legal transplantation takes place in a continuum. As one of us
(Peter Yu) has noted in relation to the slowly emerging global effort to
transplant the fair use provision in U.S. copyright law,343 “the
jurisdictions seeking to introduce the fair use model [often] retain a
considerable part of their status quo.”344 As a result, these jurisdictions
frequently end up with hybrid transplants that incorporate the
distinctive features of a new legal standard transplanted from the
source jurisdiction while also retaining a considerable part of the
preexisting standard rooted in the recipient jurisdiction.345 In this type
of hybrid situation, it is not always easy to distinguish whether the legal
standard has evolved locally or been transplanted from abroad, or
whether the doctrine or procedure in the recipient jurisdiction differs
so significantly from that of the source jurisdiction that the local
version can no longer be fairly characterized as a legal transplant.
339. 2017 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 1, art. 100.
340. See supra text accompanying note 171.
341. See CHEN, supra note 65, at 28–29 (discussing the early Chinese legal reforms
based on the German and Japanese models).
342. See Tang, supra note 278 (“The Chinese judgments show clear sign of
borrowing the common law tests.”).
343. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
344. Peter K. Yu, Fair Use and Its Global Paradigm Evolution, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 111,
157 [hereinafter Yu, Fair Use].
345. We readily acknowledge that the ASIs issued in China are not necessarily
identical to the ASIs issued in the United States or elsewhere. One of the most notable
differences is the global scope of the ASIs issued by the Wuhan court in InterDigital v.
Xiaomi and Samsung v. Ericsson, which is far broader than the ASIs issued by U.S. courts
in prior FRAND cases. See discussion supra Sections III.C.2, III.C.4.
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Finally, from both an academic and a policy standpoint, there are
many benefits to viewing the ASIs issued by Chinese courts as legal
transplants. Such a perspective allows us to link developments in China
with those in other jurisdictions, thereby enriching our understanding
of recent Chinese legal and intellectual property developments.
Because legal transplant is a useful concept for comparative legal
analysis, such linkage will also enable us to develop a deeper
appreciation of the fast-changing landscape of international patent
litigation, especially in relation to SEP disputes and FRAND licensing.
C. Why Did China Transplant ASIs?
Before 2020, Chinese courts had not restrained parties from
pursuing intellectual property proceedings in foreign courts. This
fairly restrained position changed dramatically after the SPC issued its
first ASI in a SEP dispute, creating international preclusive effect that
has serious ramifications for both the domestic legal system and
transnational civil litigation.346 To help develop a richer and more
holistic understanding of the emergence of ASIs in China, as well as
the reasons behind the Chinese courts’ sudden position shift, this
Section identifies the various forces driving the introduction of ASIs in
China—and, for many, the transplant of a foreign procedural
mechanism. It groups these forces in two broad categories: (1) legal
and judicial developments and (2) developments in the intellectual
property and innovation domain.
1.

Legal and judicial developments
a. Jurisdiction and judicial sovereignty

Like the essential purpose of ASIs in foreign jurisdictions, a key
objective behind the Chinese courts’ issuance of ASIs is to protect their
jurisdiction and, in turn, judicial sovereignty. Such protection provides
the primary and immediate cause of transplanting ASIs into China. As
the SPC observes in its report on Conversant v. Huawei:
Dealing with ASIs is an unavoidable problem confronting the
Chinese judiciary in the intellectual property area. Many Chinese
lawsuits have already encountered ASIs issued by courts in other
countries. The internationalization trend surrounding ASIs
profoundly reflects the competition among major powers for
jurisdiction over international disputes and for dominance in
346. See discussion supra Section III.C.
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rulemaking. The ASI is an important tool for preventing and
reducing the abuse of parallel litigation and safeguarding national
judicial sovereignty. Without ASIs, Chinese courts will be put in a
passive position in the international judicial competition.347

As noted in Section II.D, an ASI is usually issued by a court against a
party taking part in an action in that court and does not seek directly
to limit the jurisdiction of a foreign court. In practice, however, an ASI
indirectly affects the jurisdiction of a foreign court by preventing the
enjoined party and related parties from initiating, or continuing to
take part in, an action in the affected court.348 Judicial sovereignty is an
integral part of national sovereignty, and courts are generally unwilling
to tolerate intrusions upon, or damage to, their judicial sovereignty. As
a result, issues involving judicial sovereignty tend to be politically
sensitive.
In general, the court first seised of the action is expected to have
priority to exercise jurisdiction, at least during the pendency of the
action. For example, Article 21 of the 1968 Brussels Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, which is applicable to the members of the
European Union, states explicitly: “Where proceedings involving the
same cause of action and between the same parties are brought in the
courts of different Contracting States, any court other than the court
first seised shall of its own motion decline jurisdiction in favour of that
court.”349 In Allianz SpA v West Tankers Inc.,350 the European Court of
Justice (now the Court of Justice of the European Union) relied on
this provision to prohibit the use of ASIs among EU member states.351
347. First ASI Issued, supra note 320. Similar views have been expressed earlier. See,
e.g., Ding Wenyan (丁文严) & Han Ping (韩萍), Zhongguo Qiye Zhuanli Shewai Sifa Baohu
Zhong De Guanxia Kunjing Yu Yingdui (中国企业专利涉外司法保护中的管辖困境与应对)
[The Jurisdictional Dilemma and Responses Concerning Foreign-Related Judicial Protection of
Patents Owned by Chinese Enterprises], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO (人民法院报) [PEOPLE’S CT.
DAILY] (May 30, 2018), http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/images/2018-05/30/
07/2018053007_pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ8G-9HBM] (underscoring that ASIs
issued by foreign courts through long-arm jurisdiction “will inevitably damage China’s
judicial credibility and reduce its judicial authority on an international scale”).
348. For instance, “American courts have generally refused to distinguish between
addressing an injunction to parties before a court and addressing an injunction to the
court itself.” George A. Bermann, The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International
Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589, 589 n.1 (1990).
349. 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, art. 21.
350. Case C-185/07, 2009 E.C.R. I-686 (Grand Chamber).
351. Id. at I-699.
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Nevertheless, in the absence of an international consensus or a
treaty-based obligation to harmonize or regulate transnational ASIs,
AASIs, and AAASIs, no court appears willing to give up its judicial
sovereignty to abide by such a first-seised principle. Instead, courts
appear to feel compelled to develop new approaches to protect their
own jurisdiction.
One way that courts may be willing to adjust their positions on
judicial sovereignty is through the principle of reciprocity. In China,
this principle is embodied in Article 5 of the Civil Procedure Law,
which provides, in pertinent part:
If the courts of a foreign country impose restrictions on the civil
procedural rights of citizens, legal persons and other organizations
of the People’s Republic of China, the people’s courts of the
People’s Republic of China shall implement the principle of
reciprocity in respect of the civil procedural rights of citizens,
enterprises and organizations of that foreign country.352

Linking the principle of reciprocity to ASIs helps explain why
Chinese courts were eager to transplant this foreign procedural
mechanism. Although no domestic court has an obligation to
recognize and enforce ASIs issued by foreign courts, the principle of
reciprocity may cause them to exercise restraint in cases involving
foreign ASIs if the issuing courts are willing to do the same in return.
Nevertheless, before Chinese courts can apply the principle of
reciprocity in the ASI context, they need their own ASI mechanism.
Thus, to some extent, the ASI can be viewed as a tool enabling Chinese
courts to make reciprocal arrangements to promote international
comity.
The Chinese courts’ ability to effectively respond to undesirable
foreign court orders issued against parties appearing before them can
also be tied to the ongoing effort to increase China’s discourse power
(huayuquan) over foreign-related (shewai) matters.353 In recent years,
such power has become a hotly discussed topic in China, finding its
way into speeches and resolutions made by top leaders. For instance,
in an important nationwide macro-level guidance decision, the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China (Central Committee)
underscored the need to “actively participate in the formulation of
352. 2017 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 1, art. 5.
353. See Wang Jiangyu, Between Power Politics and International Economic Law: Asian
Regionalism, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and U.S.-China Trade Relations, 30 PACE INT’L L.
REV. 383, 428–31 (2018) (discussing China’s recent push for greater “discursive power”
in international affairs).
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international rules, promote the handling of foreign-related economic
and social affairs in accordance with the law, and enhance China’s
discourse power and influence in international legal affairs.”354 This
policy guidance helped set an important tone for subsequent
developments in China’s foreign-related legal affairs.
More specifically, in the intellectual property area and in relation to
the SEP debate, a growing volume of scholarly publications have
focused on or discussed foreign-related discourse power.355 With the
country’s growing desire to increase this power, it is understandable
why measures that would help strengthen the protection of judicial

354. Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Major Achievements and
Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century (adopted at the Fourth
Plenary Session Eighteenth Cent. Comm., Oct. 23, 2014), translated at
https://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latestreleases/202111/16/content_WS6193a93
5c6d0df57f98e50b0.html [https://perma.cc/P8PB-82MG].
355. See, e.g., Huang Jin (黄进), Xi Jinping Quanqiu Zhili Yu Guoji Fazhi Sixiang Yanjiu
(习近平全球治理与国际法治思想研究) [Research on Xi Jinping’s Thought on Global
Governance and International Rule of Law], ZHONGGUO FAXUE (中国法学) [CHINA LEGAL
SCI.], no. 5, 2017, at 5; Kong Xiangjun (孔祥俊), Lun Zhishi Chanquan De Gonggong
Zhengce Xing (论知识产权的公共政策性) [On the Public Policy Nature of Intellectual Property],
SHANGHAI JIAOTONG DAXUE XUEBAO (上海交通大学学报(哲学社会科学版)) [J. SHANGHAI
JIAO TONG UNIV. (PHIL. & SOC. SCI.)], no. 3, 2021, at 19; Ma Yide (马一德), Zhongguo
Zhishi Chanquan Zhili Sishi Nian (中国知识产权治理四十年) [Forty Years of Intellectual
Property Governance in China], FAXUE PINGLUN (法学评论) [L. REV.], no. 6, 2019, at 10;
Zhang Naigen (张乃根), “Yidai Yilu” Changyi Xia De Guoji Jingmao Guize Zhi Zhonggou
(“一带一路”倡议下的国际经贸规则之重构) [The Reconstruction of International Economic and
Trade Rules Under the Belt and Road Initiative], FAXUE (法学) [LEGAL SCI.], no. 5, 2016, at
93; Zhu Jianjun (祝建军), Biaozhun Biyao Zhuanli Jinsuling Yu Fan Jinsuling Banfa De
Chongtu Ji Yingdui (标准必要专利禁诉令与反禁诉令颁发的冲突及应对) [The Conflict Created
by the Issuance of SEP-Related Anti-Suit Injunctions and Anti-Anti-Suit-Injunctions and
Responses], ZHISHI CHANQUAN (知识产权) [INTELL. PROP.], no. 6, 2021, at 14; Zhu Yiang
(朱怡昂), Zhongguo Guoji Shangshi Fating Guanxiaquan Yanjiu (中国国际商事法庭管辖权研
究) [Research on the Jurisdiction of the China International Commercial Court], FALÜ SHIYONG

(法律适用) [J.L. APPLICATION], no. 7, 2021, at 136; Jiang Huasheng (蒋华胜), Biaozhun
Biyao Zhuanli Anjian Shenli Zhong De Wenti Ji Yingdui (标准必要专利案件审理中的问题及应
对) [Problems and Reponses Concerning the Adjudication of SEP-Related Cases], RENMIN

FAYUAN BAO (人民法院报) [PEOPLE’S CT. DAILY] (May 13, 2021), http://rmfyb.
chinacourt.org/paper/html/2021-05/13/content_204367.htm [https://perma.cc/
8YQR-KRNF].
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sovereignty in foreign-related matters, such as ASIs, have become
increasingly popular.
b. Preferred forum for international intellectual property dispute
settlement
In 2018, the General Offices of the Central Committee and the State
Council jointly issued the Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the
Strengthening of Reform and Innovation in the Field of Intellectual
Property Adjudications.356 As noted in the public announcement, the
Opinions represented “the first landmark programmatic document
issued by the two General Offices that specifically addressed
intellectual property adjudications.”357 Among the basic principles
listed is one emphasizing the need to “actively build a new mode of
judicial protection with Chinese characteristics for intellectual
property rights and to continuously strengthen China’s leading power
in the international intellectual property governance rules.”358
In the context of international jurisdictional competition in the
intellectual property area, this principle has been interpreted to
encompass the objective of making Chinese courts the “preferred
place” (youxuan di) for international intellectual property dispute
settlement that is trusted by the parties concerned. This objective was
explicitly mentioned in An Outline for Building a Powerful Intellectual
Property Nation (2021–2035), which the State Council released in
September 2021.359 At the subnational level, some courts have also
356. Guanyu Jiaqiang Zhishi Chanquan Shenpan Lingyu Gaige Chuangxin Ruogan
Wenti De Yijian (关于加强知识产权审判领域改革创新若干问题的意见) [Opinions on
Several Issues Concerning the Strengthening of Reform and Innovation in the Field
of Intellectual Property Adjudications] (promulgated by the Gen. Off. Cent. Comm.
Communist Party & Gen. Off. State Council, Feb. 27, 2018), http://www.gov.cn/
xinwen/2018-02/27/content_5269267.htm
[https://perma.cc/663J-D6W9]
[hereinafter Opinions on IP Adjudications].
357. Xinwenban Jiu <Guanyu Jiaqiang Zhishi Chanquan Shenpan Lingyu Gaige
Chuangxin Ruogan Wenti De Yijian> Youguan Qingkuang Juxing Xinwen Fabu Hui (新闻办
就《关于加强知识产权审判领域改革创新若干问题的意见》有关情况举行新闻发布会)

[The
Press Office Held a Press Conference on the Situation Surrounding the Opinions on Several Issues
Concerning the Strengthening of Reform and Innovation in the Field of Intellectual Property
Adjudications], ZHONGGUO ZHENGFU WANG (中国政府网) [CHINA GOV’T NET] (Feb. 28,
2018), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-02/28/content_5269454.htm [https://
perma.cc/Z76U-JEK2].
358. Opinions on IP Adjudications, supra note 356.
359. State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Zhishi Chanquan Qiangguo
Jianshe Gangyao (2021–2035 Nian) (知识产权强国建设纲要(2021–2035年)) [An Outline
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embraced a similar objective of striving to become the “preferred
place” for intellectual property dispute resolution within the
country.360 While becoming the preferred forum for intellectual
property dispute settlement can be an end in itself, this stated objective
is also a means to the ultimate end of promoting economic
development. After all, a close relationship exists between intellectual
property protection and business environment optimization.361
2.

Intellectual property and innovation
Technological progress is one of the main drivers of contemporary
economic growth, and the intellectual property system, especially the
patent system, provides important institutional incentives to attain
such progress. China has therefore viewed intellectual property
protection as a crucial factor for promoting national interests and
global competitiveness, even though such protection involves private
rights.362 As President Xi Jinping recently declared:
Intellectual property is a core factor for competitiveness on the
international stage, as well a focal point of international dispute. We
need to have the courage and the capacity to stand up for ourselves

for Building a Powerful Intellectual Property Nation (2021–2035)], pt. VIII,
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021-09/22/content_5638714.htm [https://perma.cc/
82NN-MLAP].
360. Zhao Yan (赵岩) & Kong Qingbing (孔庆兵), Beijing Gaoyuan Chutai <Jiaqiang
Zhishi Chanquan Shenpan Cujin Chuangxin Fazhan De Ruogan Yijian> Nuli Dazao Zhishi
Chanquan Zhengduan Jiejue “Youxuan Di” (北京高院出台《加强知识产权审判促进创新发展
的若干意见》努力打造知识产权争端解决“优选地”) [The Beijing Municipal High People’s Court
Issued Several Opinions on Strengthening Intellectual Property Adjudications and Promoting
Innovative Development: Striving to Create a “Preferred Place” for Intellectual Property Dispute
Settlement], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG (中国法院网讯) CHINA CT. NET (Sept. 20, 2018),
https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2018/09/id/3509268.shtml
[https://
perma.cc/9PW7-EQST].
361. See Zhang Weilun (张伟伦), Zhongguo: Guoji Zhishi Chanquan Zhengduan
Jiejue Youxuan Di (中国：国际知识产权争端解决“优选地”) [China: “Preferred Place” for
International Intellectual Property Dispute Settlement], ZHONGGUO MAOYI BAO (中国贸易
报) [CHINA TRADE NEWS] (May 21, 2019), https://www.chinatradenews.com.cn/

epaper/content/1/2019-05/21/A6/20190521A6_pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9LM6S46] (discussing State Council’s 2018 New Progress Report on China’s Intellectual Property
Protection and Business Environment).
362. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 28, pmbl. (“[I]ntellectual property rights are
private rights.”).
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in this regard, and refuse to yield our legitimate rights and interests
or jeopardize our core national interests.363

Because Chinese leaders and policymakers view technological
innovation as one of the most crucial strategic devices for promoting
global competitiveness, the past decade has seen them attach
increasing importance to indigenous scientific and technological
innovation.364 As China Economic Daily reported in 2015:
Among the more than 100 State Council executive meetings held by
the State Council, twenty-one meetings related to scientific and
technological innovation, indicating that scientific and
technological innovation has been placed at core of country’s overall
national development.365

363. Xi Jinping, Stepping up Intellectual Property Rights Protection to Stimulate Innovative
Vigor for Fostering a New Development Dynamic, QIUSHI J. (Apr. 30, 2021),
http://en.qstheory.cn/2021-04/30/c_618275.htm
[https://perma.cc/AAH7NTVN].
364. In addition to other more widely known key objectives of promoting and
facilitating inward technology transfer and foreign investment, cultivating indigenous
technological innovation is one of the stimuli provided by the adoption of the Chinese
Patent Law in March 1984. See L. Mark Wu-Ohlson, A Commentary on China’s New Patent
and Trademark Laws, 6 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 86, 92 (1984) (“Of even greater
importance is the impact over the long term which a patent law will have on the
development of indigenous Chinese invention and technological advancement.”).
Particularly in the past decade, an increasing number of international articles
addressing, in whole or in part, China’s indigenous technological innovation from
diverse perspectives. See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus, China’s Uneasy Engagement with Intellectual
Property Reforms During Its Globalization, 22 BROWN J. WORLD AFFS. 137, 148–50 (2016)
(addressing in part the relationship between the development of China’s indigenous
innovation policy and the domestic acquisition and development of patents in key
technologies); Edward J. Walneck, The Patent Troll or Dragon: How Quantity Issues and
Chinese Nationalism Explain Recent Trends in Chinese Patent Law, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMPAR. L. 435, 447–48 (2014) (reviewing some of China’s indigenous innovation
policies to provide the background for analyzing patent-based issues in China); Wang
Heng, How May China Respond to the U.S. Trade Approach: Retaliatory, Inclusive and
Regulatory Responses, 31 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 52 (2018) (“Responding to U.S. concerns,
China agreed to eliminate its indigenous innovation products catalogues under [the
Strategic and Economic Dialogue].”); Peter K. Yu, Five Oft-repeated Questions About
China’s Recent Rise as a Patent Power, 2013 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 78, 88–96
(discussing independent innovation and intellectual property).
365. Ye Ban (叶瓣), Zhengfu Chixu Jujiao Keji Chuangxin Shuoming Shenme? (政府持续
聚焦科技创新说明什么?) [What Does the Government’s Continued Focus on Scientific and

Technological Innovation Explain?], ZHONGGUO JINGJI RIBAO (中国经济日报) [CHINA
ECON. DAILY] (Aug. 25, 2015), http://paper.ce.cn/jjrb/html/2015-08/25/
content_254474.htm [https://perma.cc/83MC-W8BW].
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This high level of attention is understandable considering China’s
history of inadequate technological development and innovation.366
For decades, Chinese policymakers have prioritized strategies and
efforts that would leap-frog the country in science and technology
while elevating its economy beyond the widely noted strength in
low-cost manufacturing.367 So far, China has made considerable
progress. For example, “[w]hile overall digitalization is still lagging
advanced economies, China has emerged as a global leader in some
key new industries,” such as e-commerce.368 In addition, based on the
latest WIPO statistics, China has had the world’s largest volume of
international applications through the Patent Cooperation Treaty
since 2019.369 The country also ranked twelfth in the latest Global
Innovation Index.370 Even though some commentators continue to
question these rankings, pointing in particular to the sharp contrast
between the volume of domestic and foreign patent filings by Chinese
366. See Xi Jinping: Chuangxin Nengli Bu Qiang Shi Woguo Fazhan De “Akaliusi Zhi
Zhong” (习近平：创新能力不强是我国发展的“阿喀琉斯之踵”) [Xi Jinping: Weak Innovation
Capacity Is the “Achilles’ Heel” of China’s Development], ZHONGGUO GONGCHAN DANG
XINWEN WANG (中国共产党新闻网) [CPC NEWS NET] (Mar. 11, 2016, 3:14 PM),
http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n1/2016/0311/c385474-28192539.html
[https://perma.cc/DYH3-TW6N].
367. For instance, China released a three-step innovation-driven development
blueprint in 2016, delineating three future objectives that were emblematic of steadfast
national innovation self-assertiveness—that is, becoming an innovative nation by 2020,
an international leader in innovation by 2030, and a world powerhouse of scientific
and technological innovation by 2050. See Guideline for China’s Innovation-Driven
Development Published, STATE COUNCIL PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC CHINA (May 20, 2016, 8:23
PM), http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2016/05/20/content_28147535
3682191.htm [https://perma.cc/9HAA-KZFG].
368. See Zhang Longmei & Sally Chen, China’s Digital Economy: Opportunities and
Risks 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 19/16, 2019).
369. See Press Release, World Intell. Prop. Org., Innovative Activity Overcomes
Pandemic Disruption—WIPO’s Global Intellectual Property Filing Services Reach
Record Levels (Feb. 10, 2022), https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2022/
article_0002.html [https://perma.cc/FTD6-87S9]; Press Release, World Intell. Prop.
Org., Innovation Perseveres: International Patent Filings via WIPO Continued to Grow
in 2020 Despite COVID-19 Pandemic (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.wipo.int/
pressroom/en/articles/2021/article_0002.html
[https://perma.cc/CJS4-HBXG];
Press Release, World Intell. Prop. Org., China Becomes Top Filer of International
Patents in 2019 amid Robust Growth for WIPO’s IP Services, Treaties and Finances
(Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2020/article_0005
.html [https://perma.cc/MJV8-YLL3].
370. GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2021: TRACKING INNOVATION THROUGH THE COVID19 CRISIS 4 (Soumitra Dutta et al. eds., 2021).
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inventors,371 there is no denying that China has made an “innovative
turn” and is now undertaking enormous amounts of intellectual
property and innovative activities.372
Since April 2020, China has also gradually begun to build a new
development pattern featuring major domestic cycles as the mainstay
while ensuring that the domestic and international cycles reinforce
each other.373 As the Xinhua News Agency reports, President Xi
“attaches great importance to self-reliance and self-strengthening in
science and technology and indigenous innovation and has frequently
emphasized this ‘basic capability’ for more than a year.”374
In April 2021, he published an intellectual property-focused article,
which garnered widespread attention both at home and abroad.375
Drawing on his speech at the group study session of the Political
Bureau of the 19th Central Committee in November 2020, this article
repeatedly stressed the importance of indigenous innovation: “Only by
rigorously protecting [intellectual property] can we safeguard
indigenous Chinese [research and development] on core technologies
in key fields and forestall and defuse major risks.”376 The article also
underscored the interface between intellectual property protection and
innovation as well as the indispensability and contemporary function of
rigorously protecting intellectual property rights—particularly patents,
which are most closely linked to scientific and technological
innovation.377

371. See Mark Cohen, Counting and Discounting Patents—The USPTO Study on
Patenting Activity in 5G, CHINA IPR (Feb. 16, 2022), https://chinaipr.com/
2022/02/16/counting-and-discounting-patents-the-uspto-study-on-patenting-activityin-5g [https://perma.cc/HJ4W-47CG] (calling for the need to have a proper
understanding of objective understanding of the threats posed by China’s emergence
as a major patent filer, especially in light of “its relatively low level of overseas filing . . .
[but] high level of domestic filing”).
372. See supra text accompanying notes 87–91; see also Yu, China’s Innovative Turn,
supra note 81, at 599–602 (discussing China’s innovative turn).
373. See Yinian Lai Xi Jinping Pinfan Qiangdiao Zhege “Jichu Nengli” (一年来，习近
平频繁强调这个“基础能力”) [Over the Past Year, Xi Jinping Has Frequently Emphasized

This “Basic Capability”], XINHUA WANG (新华网) [XINHUANET] (May 25, 2021),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/xxjxs/2021-05/25/c_1127490481.htm?
flag=true [https://perma.cc/NYT3-96J2].
374. Id.
375. See Xi, supra note 363.
376. Id.
377. Id.
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In China, at the moment, building indigenous innovation
capabilities is a key driver behind the emphasis on intellectual property
protection.378 The current debate has downplayed other roles of
intellectual property protection, such as the attraction of foreign
investment, which was heavily emphasized in the 1980s when the
modern Chinese intellectual property system was undergoing its
formative development.379
Shortly before and after President Xi’s speech, a panoply of
national-level implementation measures were released across
multiple sectors.380 The SPC also issued a new judicial interpretation
378. See sources cited supra note 364.
379. See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 72, at 180–82 (discussing the ambiguous
relationship between intellectual property and foreign direct investment in the
Chinese context); William E. Beaumont, The New Patent Law of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC): Evidence of a Second Chinese “Renaissance”?, 27 IDEA 39, 56 (1986) (“The
Chinese leadership appears particularly interested in acquiring advanced foreign
technology and foreign investment to vitalize their ambitious program of
modernization.”); Eugene A. Theroux, Technology Sales to China: New Laws and Old
Problems, 14 J. INT’L L. & ECON. 185, 192 (1980) (“During his October 1970 visit to the
United States, Trade Minister Li repeated China’s interest in attracting foreign
technology and investment.”); Wu-Ohlson, supra note 364, at 113 (“A further impetus
to change in China’s trademark system has been the policy of encouraging foreign
investment in China.”); David Ben Kay, Comment, The Patent Law of the People’s Republic
of China in Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 331, 334 (1985) (“Foreign investment and
importation of foreign technology have played an increasingly important role in
China’s modernization program since the early 1970’s, particularly since 1978, when
China adopted an ‘open-door’ economic policy.”).
380. See, e.g., Guanyu Tuidong Keyan Zuzhi Zhishi Chanquan Gaozhiliang Fazhan
De Zhidao Yijian, Guo Zhi Fa Yun Zi [2021] Qi Hao (关于推动科研组织知识产权高质量发
展的指导意见, 国知发运字【2021】7号) [Guiding Opinions on Promoting the High-

Quality Development of Intellectual Property in Scientific Research Organizations,
Notice No. 7 [2021]] (issued by the China Nat’l Intell. Prop. Admin., Chinese Acad.
Sci., Chinese Acad. Eng’g & China Ass’n Sci. & Tech., Apr. 1, 2021),
https://www.cnipa.gov.cn/art/2021/4/1/art_75_158160.html [https://perma.cc/
G45H-W39Q]; Guanyu Guifan Shenqing Zhuanli Xingwei De Banfa, Gonggao Si Yi Yi
Hao (关于规范申请专利行为的办法, 公告411号) [Measures Regarding the Regulation of
Patent Applications, Announcement No. 411] (issued by the China Nat’l Intell. Prop.
Admin., Mar. 12, 2021), https://www.cnipa.gov.cn/art/2021/3/12/art_74_157677
.html [https://perma.cc/RLG2-94GU]; Guanyu Shiye Danwei Keyan Renyuan Zhiwu
Keji Chengguo Zhuanhua Xianjin Jiangli Naru Jixiao Gongzi Guanli Youguan Wenti
De Tongzhi, Renshebu Fa [2021] Shisi Hao (关于事业单位科研人员职务科技成果转化现金
奖励纳入绩效工资管理有关问题的通知,

人社部发【2021】14号) [Notice of Issues
Concerning the Incorporation into Performance Salary Management of Cash Rewards
for the Conversion of Scientific and Technological Achievements of Scientific
Researchers in Public Institutions, Notice No. 14 [2021]] (issued by the Ministry Hum.
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on the award of punitive damages in intellectual property cases381 as
well as a new judicial protection plan.382 Taken together, these
measures and the overall effort to promote indigenous innovation
reflect the strong political will of the top Chinese leadership.
In sum, two sets of forces have been working in tandem to drive
Chinese courts to issue ASIs. On one hand, the political sensitivity
associated with protecting judicial sovereignty spurs the transplantation
of ASIs as a means to curb growing duplicative parallel foreign litigation
over SEPs and FRAND licensing. On the other hand, the enhanced
political will among the top Chinese leadership383 to improve
indigenous innovation capabilities has augmented the position and
weight of the patent system. Of direct relevance is the issuance of ASIs,
which have become an integral part of this system and will likely be
expanded in the near future.

Ress. & Soc. Sec., Ministry Fin. & Ministry Sci. & Tech., Feb. 8, 2021),
http://www.mohrss.gov.cn//xxgk2020/fdzdgknr/zcfg/gfxwj/rcrs/202103/t2021033
0_412031.html [https://perma.cc/H5A5-7BVZ]; Guanyu Xiugai <Zhuanli Shencha
Zhinan>, Gonggao San Jiu Yi Hao (关于修改《专利审查指南》, 公告391号)
[Announcement of the Amendment of the Patent Examination Guidelines,
Announcement No. 391] (issued by the China Nat’l Intell. Prop. Admin., Dec. 14,
2020), https://www.cnipa.gov.cn/art/2020/12/14/art_74_155606.html [https://
perma.cc/4WHD-54YV].
381. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Chutai Zhishi Chanquan Chengfa Xing Peichang Sifa
Jieshi Yifa Chengchu Yanzhong Qinhai Zhishi Chanquan Xingwei, Fashi [2021]
Si Hao ( 最高人民法院出台知识产权惩罚性赔偿司法解释依法惩处严重侵害知识产权行为 ,
法释【 2021 】 4 号 ) [Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Punitive

Damages Applicable to Civil Intellectual Property Cases, Judicial Interpretation No. 4
[2021]] (promulgated by the Judicial Comm. Sup. People’s Ct., Feb. 7, 2021),
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-288861.html
[https://perma.cc/Z7RKMPC8].
382. SUPREME PEOPLE’S CT., RENMIN FAYUAN ZHISHI CHANQUAN SIFA BAOHU GUIHUA
(2021–2025
NIAN)
(人民法院知识产权司法保护规划(2021–2025年))
[JUDICIAL
PROTECTION PLAN OF THE PEOPLE’S COURT FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2021–
2025)] (2021), http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-297981.html [https://
perma.cc/973X-ULTE].
383. See Zongshuji Wei “Keji Zili Ziqiang” Jiashang Le Yige Zhongyao Dingyu (总书记为“
科技自立自强”加上了一个重要定语) [General Secretary Added an Important Attribute to Self-

Reliance and Self-Strengthening in Science and Technology], XINHUA WANG (新华网)
XINHUANET (May 29, 2021, 1:12 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/
2021-05/29/c_1127505875.htm [https://perma.cc/7ZGM-WWDK] (reporting the
first time President Xi’s addition of the “high-level” attribute to self-reliance and selfstrengthening in science and technology).
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D. ASIs Compared with Pharmaceutical Transplants in China
To highlight the unprecedented nature of the ASI transplant in
China, it is instructive to compare it with two other recently adopted
transplants in the pharmaceutical area.384 In April 2018, the National
Medical Products Administration of China, the Chinese equivalent of
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, released the draft Provisional
Measures for the Implementation of Test Data Protection for
Pharmaceutical Products.385 Article 5 provides twelve years of market
exclusivity to undisclosed test or other data for innovative therapeutic
biological products (chuangxin zhiliao yong shengwu zhipin).386 This draft
provision puts China in parity with the United States, which offers
similar protection.387 China’s willingness to proactively transplant U.S.
market exclusivities for biological products is interesting because the
United States has been unsuccessful in transplanting this standard
abroad through recent international trade negotiations. For instance,
during the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, the American
negotiators’ strong push for market exclusivities for biological
products were met with heavy opposition from their counterparts.388
384. One could further compare the ASI transplant with the introduction of a new
patent linkage system in China under Article 76 of the 2020 Patent Law. 2020 Patent
Law, supra note 91, art. 76. This Section, however, does not make such a comparison,
in view of the unsettled debate over whether patent linkage was already transplanted
to China two decades ago. See Benjamin P. Liu, Fighting Poison with Poison? The Chinese
Experience with Pharmaceutical Patent Linkage, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 623,
629 (2012) (“China is the first country to feature regulatory patent linkage outside of
North America and has had linkage regulations on its books for a full decade.”).
385. Yaopin Shiyan Shuju Baohu Shishi Banfa (Zanxing) (药品试验数据保护实施办法
(暂行)) [Provisional Measures for the Implementation of Test Data Protection for
Pharmaceutical Products] [hereinafter Provisional Measures], https://chinaipr2
.files.wordpress.com/2018/04/draftdataexclusivityrules.doc (last visited Apr. 13,
2022); see also Yu, China’s Innovative Turn, supra note 81, at 602–03 (discussing these
provisional measures).
386. Provisional Measures, supra note 385, art. 5. But see Mark Cohen, Unpacking the
Role of IP Legislation in the Trade War, CHINA IPR (May 19, 2019), https://chinaipr.com/
2019/05/19/unpacking-the-role-of-ip-legislation-in-the-trade-war [https://perma.cc/
755L-A6QT] (“There were also rumors that China and [the United States Trade
Representative] has scaled back regulatory data protection for biologics from the 12
years that had originally been proposed by China in 2018 to the 10 year period
provided by the US Mexico Canada Free Trade Agreement.”).
387. Compare Provisional Measures, supra note 385, art. 5 (providing twelve years of
market exclusivity to biological products), with 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (same).
388. See Frederick M. Abbott, The Evolution of Public Health Provisions in Preferential
Trade and Investment Agreements of the United States, in CURRENT ALLIANCES IN
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Likewise, even though the United States managed to include, to the
disappointment of both Canada and Mexico, a weakened version of
the provision on biological products in the 2018 text of the United
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement,389 that provision was eventually
removed when the agreement was amended in December 2019.390
The second transplant occurred in October 2020, when China
adopted the Fourth Amendment to the Patent Law.391 Entering into
effect on June 1, 2021, this Amendment provided the latest updates to
the Patent Law, which, as Section I.C noted, included mostly legal
transplants from developed countries until the late 2000s.392 Article 42
of the amended statute grants a limited extension of the patent term
for up to five years to compensate for the time lost when a
pharmaceutical product is undergoing regulatory review.393 This new
provision parallels the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984394 in the United
States and similar provisions on patent term extension in TRIPS-plus
bilateral, regional, and plurilateral agreements.395
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWMAKING: THE EMERGENCE AND IMPACT OF
MEGA-REGIONALS 45, 55 (Pedro Roffe & Xavier Seuba eds., 2017); Peter K. Yu, Data
Exclusivities and the Limits to TRIPS Harmonization, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 641, 676 (2019).
After the United States’ withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, the
remaining signatories suspended the provision on biological products when it
established the replacement pact. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership, Mar. 8, 2018, art. 2, annex, https://www.
mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trade-agreements/CPTPP/Comprehensive-and-ProgressiveAgreement-for-Trans-Pacific-Partnership-CPTPP-English.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
FS8Q-KX7U] (suspending Article 18.51 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement).
389. United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement art. 20.49, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Nov. 30,
2018,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-statesmexico-canada-agreement [https://perma.cc/2VDM-W28S] (offering protection to
the undisclosed test or other data for biological products “for a period of at least ten
years from the date of first marketing approval of that product”).
390. Protocol of Amendment to the Agreement Between the United States of
America, the United Mexican States, and Canada art. 3.E, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 10,
2019, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Protocolof-Amendments-to-the-United-States-Mexico-Canada-Agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JY2S-3S9U].
391. 2020 Patent Law, supra note 91.
392. See supra text accompanying notes 73–86.
393. 2020 Patent Law, supra note 91, art. 42.
394. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, § 201(a), 98 Stat. 1585, 1598–1602 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 156) (providing a
limited extension of the patent term based on the period during which a
pharmaceutical product undergoes regulatory review).
395. See, e.g., Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, art.
15.9.6, Aug. 5, 2004, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-
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At first glance, these two pharmaceutical transplants are similar to
the ASI transplant. All three transplants are important to patent
holders—domestic and foreign alike. They were also adopted to make
China more innovative and globally competitive. While the ASI
transplant positions the country and local patent holders better in the
debates on SEPs and FRAND licensing and in global intellectual
property litigation, the pharmaceutical transplants strengthen the
local pharmaceutical sector while seeking to attract foreign
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies to undertake research
and development in China.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, the two pharmaceutical transplants
continue the narrative of external pressure (“push” factors) and
selective adaptation (both “push” and “pull” factors) discussed in
Section I.B.396 The patent term extension in Article 42 was adopted in
part to respond to U.S. demands made over the years and enshrined
more recently in Article 1.12 of the United States-China Economic and
Trade Agreement,397 and the market exclusivities in Article 5 of the
Provisional Measures address a demand that the United States has also
made repeatedly in international trade and intellectual property
fora.398 By contrast, China has not encountered any external demands
from the United States or other governments to introduce ASIs. In fact,

dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text
[https://perma.cc/Q6N92EDN]; United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-U.S., art. 17.9.8, May 18,
2004, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/australian-fta/finaltext [https://perma.cc/M9K6-KXNL]; United States-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement, Sing.-U.S., art. 16.7.8, May 6, 2003, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/
free-trade-agreements/singapore-fta/final-text [https://perma.cc/EMS7-HAKB].
396. See discussion supra Section I.B.
397. Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China art. 1.12,
China-U.S., Jan. 15, 2020, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/
phase%20one%20agreemen/Economic_And_Trade_Agreement_Between_The_Uni
ted_States_And_China_Text.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8HQ-VY9N]. This Agreement
is also referred to as the Phase One Agreement. This provision, along with other
changes in the recent amendment, has been under deliberation in China for years. It
remains an open question whether the Phase One Agreement led to the adoption of
some of these changes or whether that agreement merely incorporated those changes
that had already been underway. See Peter K. Yu, US-China Intellectual Property Trade
Wars, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRADE WARS 271, 280 (Zeng Ka & Liang Wei eds.,
2022) [hereinafter Yu, US-China IP Trade Wars]; Yu, Long and Winding Road, supra note
96, at 708.
398. See supra text accompanying notes 388–92.
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as noted in Section III.C, courts in the United States and Europe have
had strong reactions to the issuance of ASIs by Chinese courts.399
Like the dynamics regarding external pressure, the institutional
setting for these transplants differs significantly. While the
pharmaceutical transplants (and most other legal transplants) were
effected through legislative action in China, the transplantation of
ASIs did not require the introduction of new legislation. Instead, the
ASI transplants arose mostly from the Chinese courts’ desire to
respond to actions taken by foreign courts and the interpretation of
existing procedural rules to grant this new form of relief. Such a
judicially driven transplant represents a novel approach to legal
transplantation in China, if not more broadly.
Moreover, the two sets of transplants have very different
orientations. Even though all of them were brought into China and
customized to improve the country’s national advantage,400 the
pharmaceutical transplants have a mostly inward-looking orientation.
They focus on the essential legal standards that China will need to
improve the position of the local sector in the area of pharmaceutical
innovation. If such improvements have generated a global impact,
such as China’s increasing competitiveness vis-à-vis the European
Union, the United States, and other developed countries, the impact
is somewhat indirect.
By contrast, the ASI transplant has an outward-looking orientation.
Apart from protecting judicial sovereignty, the transplant aims to
increase China’s discourse power over foreign-related matters while
enhancing the country’s ability to compete as a preferred forum for
international intellectual property dispute resolution. Unlike the
pharmaceutical transplants, which aim to improve domestic
capabilities and conditions, the ASI transplant focuses on cross-border
or global engagement.
Finally, and importantly for our purposes, the ASI transplant enables
China to influence the development of global standards relating to
SEPs and FRAND licensing. As the SPC declared in the April 2021
report noted earlier, China is no longer content to be a “follower” of
international intellectual property rules, but it also wants to be a
“guide” who helps shape these rules.401 Even though it remains to be
seen what future role China will play in shaping international rules in
399. See discussion supra Section III.C.5.
400. See Yu, China’s Innovative Turn, supra note 81, at 603–05.
401. See supra text accompanying note 276.
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the area of SEPs and FRAND licensing, there is no denying that the
emergence of ASIs in the country has caught the attention of
policymakers and commentators—domestic and foreign alike.
To some extent, the ASI transplant in China has created a
boomerang effect in other countries.402 Even though ASIs originated
abroad and may not have direct antecedents in China,403 they have now
been transplanted to China with serious ramifications in the United
States and other foreign jurisdictions. This boomerang effect recalls
the legal transplant literature concerning how a law, once
transplanted, can affect the source jurisdiction as much as the
recipient jurisdiction.404 The transplant of a foreign procedural
mechanism to preempt foreign interests also brings up the widely used
yi yi zhi yi policy of imperial China, which historians have translated as
“using foreigner barbarians to control foreigner barbarians.”405 In the
ASI context, the transplant allows Chinese courts to respond to foreign
legal actions by adapting a foreign procedural mechanism.
In sum, the ASI mechanism represents a new form of legal transplant
in China. It shows how the legal transplantation process has evolved in
the twenty-first century and alerts us to the global ramifications of this
evolving process.

402. Commentators have discussed the boomerang effect in other international
intellectual property contexts. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the
Twenty-First Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115,
1119 (2009) (“[A]s often happens in international law, efforts to rig a regime for shortterm advantages may turn out, in the medium-and long-term, to boomerang against
those who pressed hardest for its adoption.”); Harold C. Wegner, TRIPs Boomerang—
Obligations for Domestic Reform, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 535 (1996) (discussing the
boomerang effect created by the TRIPS Agreement); Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now
Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975, 1044–70 (2011) (discussing the boomerang
effect created by the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement).
403. See discussion supra Section III.A.
404. See Bentham, supra note 36, at 185 (“That a system might be devised, which,
while it would be better for Bengal, would also be better even for England.”); WATSON,
supra note 36, at 99 (“[T]he time of reception is often a time when the provision is
looked at closely, hence a time when law can be reformed or made more sophisticated.
It thus gives the recipient society a fine opportunity to become a donor in its turn.”);
Yu, Fair Use, supra note 344, at 159 (noting that “legal transplant is a two-way street”
that will affect both source and recipient jurisdictions).
405. See Peter K. Yu, Can the Canadian UGC Exception Be Transplanted Abroad?, 26
INTELL. PROP. J. 175, 183 (2014) (linking legal transplants to the yi yi zhi yi policy of
imperial China).
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CONCLUSION
In view of the international jurisdictional battles in cases involving
SEPs and FRAND licensing and the potential boomerang effect
generated by China’s transplant of ASIs, one logically would wonder
whether solutions can be crafted to reduce these tensions and
confrontations. In the past few years, commentators have advanced a
wide variety of proposals. For example, one of us (Contreras) has
called for the establishment of a global, non-governmental rate-setting
tribunal to determine FRAND rates.406 He recommends that domestic
courts voluntarily refrain from setting global FRAND rates until an
international solution has been implemented to resolve FRAND
disputes.407 Another of us (Yu Yang, along with Zhang Lei) has offered
a trade-based solution that relies on international coordination and
the development of new plurilateral norms.408 Other commentators
have advanced a wide variety of proposals, including “mandatory ‘ex
ante’ rate disclosures, collective rate agreements, expedited bilateral
arbitration, . . . [and] patent pooling structures.”409
Instead of rehashing these proposals, this Article concludes by
calling for a renewed emphasis on international comity. Such an
emphasis will be important not only for reducing international
jurisdictional battles in global FRAND litigation and other contexts,
but also for minimizing the complications and unintended
consequences caused by proactive legal transplants. The principle of
international comity also reflects a widely settled international
consensus. Thanks to legal transplants, Chinese courts have now
joined U.S. courts in considering the impact on international comity
before issuing an ASI, AASI, or AAASI.410
The discussion of this important principle in international litigation
brings us back to Ericsson v. Samsung,411 the case that began this Article.
When the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas was
406. Jorge L. Contreras, Global Rate-Setting: A Solution for Standards-Essential Patents?,
94 WASH. L. REV. 701 (2019).
407. Jorge L. Contreras, Anti-Suit Injunctions and Jurisdictional Competition in Global
FRAND Litigation: The Case for Judicial Restraint, 11 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 171
(2021).
408. Yu Yang & Zhang Lei, A Trade-Based Approach to Resolving Escalating FRANDbased Disputes in the Digital Age, 12 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. L. (forthcoming 2022).
409. See Contreras, New Extraterritoriality, supra note 138, at 287 (collecting and
summarizing proposals).
410. See supra text accompanying notes 152 and 246.
411. Ericsson Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:20-CV-00380-JRG, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4392 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2021).
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deciding whether to issue an AASI in response to the ASI issued by the
Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court, a key consideration was whether
the injunction would have a significant impact on international
comity.412 Drawing on the amicus brief that two of us (Contreras and
Peter Yu) and other academic colleagues submitted to the Federal
Circuit, this Article argues that, contrary to the belief held by some
judges, commentators, and litigants, a court’s willingness to respect an
ASI validly issued by a foreign court and exercise restraint in issuing
AASIs can promote international comity.413 As the brief noted in
relation to the AASI issued by the Texas court:
It should not be ignored that many . . . ASIs have been directed at
enjoining parallel Chinese proceedings. If a Chinese ASI will not be
honored by U.S. courts, Chinese courts may well respond in kind,
denying litigants in both jurisdictions streamlined resolution of their
disputes and exacerbating the problem [of duplicative parallel
litigation].414

Indeed, “[i]f U.S. courts expect foreign legal systems to respect their
own injunctions, it is difficult to see how that deference will be
maintained if it is not reciprocal.”415 Efforts to promote international
comity will therefore invite courts to pay attention to the growing need
for transnational judicial reciprocity,416 an issue that is of great
importance to courts in China as well as other jurisdictions. Such
reciprocity is badly needed considering the growing volume of parallel
FRAND litigation and the fact that China now has the world’s largest
volume of intellectual property litigation.417
To be sure, many American judges, policymakers, and litigants will
question the Chinese courts’ ability to render fair decisions in FRAND
cases involving American litigants, especially amid an ongoing trade

412. Ericsson, No. 2:20-CV-00380-JRG (E.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2020) (granting the
temporary restraining order).
413. International Intellectual Property Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 11.
414. Id. at 26–27.
415. Id. at 6–7.
416. See Quaak v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11,
19 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[C]omity is . . . a protean concept of jurisdictional respect”).
417. See CHINA NAT’L INTELL. PROP. ADMIN. (国家知识产权局), 2020 ZHONGGUO ZHISHI
CHANQUAN BAOHU ZHUANGKUANG (二零二零中国知识产权保护状况) [THE STATUS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA IN 2020] 4 (2020), http://www.gov.cn/
xinwen/2021-04/25/5602104/files/9cfbfa3fed814e1f9d04e5695ed13fb.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QZ6K-9GK5] (reporting 443,326 new intellectual property cases and 28,528
new patent cases in China in 2020).
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war.418 Nevertheless, just as American judges worry that Chinese courts
may treat U.S. litigants unfairly, Chinese judges may also question
whether American courts will adequately protect the interests of
Chinese businesses and individuals, especially in view of the aggressive
actions the U.S. government took against Huawei and ZTE in the
previous Administration.419 In a world of strong mutual distrust, the
problem generated by ASIs and international jurisdictional battles will
only escalate, leading one of us (Contreras) to lament how global
FRAND litigation has become “anti-suit injunctions all the way
down.”420
Given these international jurisdictional battles and the inherent
challenges of resolving global FRAND disputes, it may take some time
before countries develop the needed long-term solutions. Fortunately,
a renewed emphasis on international comity and greater attention to
the need for transnational judicial reciprocity can help slow down
these battles. Even better, such an emphasis can be spread through
court decisions as well as the judicial community.421 To the extent that
those courts that have now embraced ASIs continue to pay attention to
the rulings of other courts, a greater emphasis on international comity
in one court could be easily “transplanted” to another, benefiting both
the source and recipient jurisdictions.

418. See China Briefing Team, U.S.-China Relations in the Biden-Era: A Timeline, CHINA
BRIEFING (Oct. 12, 2021), https://www.china-briefing.com/news/us-china-relationsin-the-biden-era-a-timeline (providing an updated timeline of U.S.-China
developments during the Biden Administration); Dorcas Wong & Alexander Chipman
Koty, The US-China Trade War: A Timeline, CHINA BRIEFING (Aug. 25, 2020),
https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-us-china-trade-war-a-timeline
[https://perma.cc/KN5D-NGRL] (providing an updated timeline of the tariffs China
and the United States have imposed as part of the trade war).
419. See Yu, US-China IP Trade Wars, supra note 397, at 280.
420. Contreras, All the Way Down, supra note 19, at 14.
421. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65–103 (2004)
(discussing the interactions of judges in a transnational network).

